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REGULATING WAGE THEFT
Jennifer J. Lee & Annie Smith*
Abstract: Wage theft costs workers billions of dollars each year. During a time when the
federal government is rolling back workers’ rights, it is essential to consider how state and
local laws can address the problem. As this Article explains, the pernicious practice of wage
theft seemingly continues unabated, despite a recent wave of state and local laws to curtail it.
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of state and local anti-wage theft
laws. Through a compilation of 141 state and local anti-wage theft laws enacted over the past
decade, this Article offers an original typology of the most common anti-wage theft
regulatory strategies. An evaluation of these laws shows that they are unlikely to
meaningfully reduce wage theft. Specifically, the typology reveals that many of the most
popular anti-wage theft strategies involve authorizing worker complaints, creating or
enhancing penalties, or mandating employers to disclose information to workers about their
wage-related rights. Lessons learned about these conventional regulatory strategies from
other contexts raise serious questions about whether these state and local laws can be
successful.
Rather than concede defeat, this Article contends that there are useful insights to be
drawn from the typology and analysis. It concludes by recognizing promising regulatory
innovations, identifying new collaborative approaches to enhance agency enforcement, and
looking beyond regulation to nongovernmental strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
The opening months of the Trump Administration were full of bad
news for low-wage workers. Among other things, the Administration
announced it would abandon rules that sought to ensure that service
workers would get their tips, help workers more easily recover minimum
and overtime wages from employers, and drastically increase the number
of workers entitled to overtime pay.1 It also put in place a hiring freeze
1. Juliet Eilperin, The Trump Administration Just Changed Its Overtime Guidance—and Business
Cheers, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-trumpadministration-just-changed-its-overtime-guidance—and-business-cheers/2018/01/08/f00d3eee-
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that reduced the staff of the federal agency tasked with protecting
workers’ wages.2
State and local laws could help to lessen the blow. Over the preceding
decade, energized worker movements have driven states and localities to
promote the rights of low-wage workers.3 Across the country, they have
enacted laws seeking to protect workers from misclassification as
independent contractors, to increase the minimum wage, and to address
wage theft.4
Wage theft costs workers billions of dollars each year.5 Stories
abound of low-wage workers and their families who struggle to keep a
roof over their heads or to pay for food or medicine because an employer
failed to pay their wages.6 Beyond individual workers, wage theft
increases the poverty rate and costs the government millions of dollars
annually in lost tax revenue.7
To respond to the wage theft crisis, energized worker movements
have prompted states and localities to enact anti-wage theft laws. This
Article presents the first comprehensive survey and critical analysis of
state and local laws enacted over roughly the past decade through a
compilation of 141 state and local laws. These laws include seventy state
laws and seventy-one local ordinances, overwhelmingly enacted in
Democratic-leaning jurisdictions. Given that states and localities
responded in diverse ways to the problem of wage theft, we created a
typology of the twenty-two most common regulatory strategies for the
f4a6-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d_story.html?utm_term=.90632aa1f8df
[https://perma.cc/3K2EP2LR]; Julia Horowitz, Trump Administration Backs away from Obama Overtime Rule, CNN
MONEY (June 30, 2017, 5:24 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/30/news/trump-labordepartment-obama-overtime-rules/index.html [https://perma.cc/PDE6-V932]; Ben Penn, Labor
Dept. Ditches Data Showing Bosses Could Skim Workers’ Tips, BLOOMBERG L. DAILY LAB. REP.
(Feb. 1, 2018, 3:01 AM), https://bnanews.bna.com/daily-labor-report/labor-dept-ditches-data-onworker-tips-retained-by-businesses [https://perma.cc/TV8M-32KW].
2. Jessica Kwong, Trump Slashed Staffing in All Cabinet Departments Except Three, Reversing
Obama
Hiring
Expansion,
NEWSWEEK
(Dec.
31,
2017,
2:40
PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-slashed-staffing-all-cabinet-departments-except-three-reversingobama-767047 [https://perma.cc/8HYG-PBEW].
3. While worker movements are diverse across the country, they often comprise workers,
advocates from worker centers, community-based organizations, legal nonprofits, and unions. See
infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
4. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE 17–34, 71–79, 83–97 (2011).
5. DAVID COOPER & THERESA KROEGER, EMPLOYERS STEAL BILLIONS FROM WORKERS’ PAYCHECKS
EACH YEAR 1 (2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paycheckseach-year-survey-data-show-millions-of-workers-are-paid-less-than-the-minimum-wage-at-significant-costto-taxpayers-and-state-economies/ [https://perma.cc/HZ9F-CNZF].
6. FABIOLA SANTIAGO ET AL., HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED LOS ANGELES
WAGE THEFT ORDINANCE 26–29 (2014).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 28–33.
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purposes of comparison. These most common strategies fall into five
categories that: (1) authorize worker complaints; (2) create or enhance
penalties; (3) regulate information; (4) strengthen anti-retaliation
protections; and (5) expand employer liability.
This Article questions whether these ambitious and hard-won state
and local anti-wage theft laws will make a meaningful difference. An
analysis reveals that many of the most common anti-wage theft
regulatory strategies, such as those authorizing worker complaints,
creating or enhancing penalties, and requiring information disclosures,
may fail to significantly reduce wage theft. The efficacy of strategies
that authorize worker complaints is questionable because of the multiple
barriers that exist for low-wage workers to name, blame, and claim wage
theft against their employers.8 Creating or enhancing penalties on the
books will also do little to deter wage theft if agencies lack the resources
or political will to engage in enforcement or if employers fail to
understand how to comply.9 Further, the success of information
disclosure strategies that require employers to post notices or provide
mandatory disclosures about wage-related rights and information are
limited because they fail to take into account how low-wage workers
may process or use such information.10
Anti-wage theft laws thus illustrate the more general critiques of the
familiar and conventional strategies by which regulation seeks to solve
social problems. Rights-claiming strategies, for example, rely on harmed
individuals to file a complaint. Law and society scholarship, however,
repeatedly documents how such rights-claiming may be “easier to bear
for those who have many forms and volumes of capital” but become “a
heavier, often disabling burden that reinscribes disadvantage for those

8. Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An
Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1088 (2014); William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel &
Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15
L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 636 (1981); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards
Enforcement Through Partnership with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 555 (2010);
David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of
Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 60 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 69–70 (2006) (finding the rate
of worker complaints to be “exceedingly low”).
9. Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 118–19 (2018);
David Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy: Why Enforcement Matters, 28
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 129 (2006) [hereinafter Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace
Regulatory Policy]. But see Daniel J. Galvin, Deterring Wage Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and
the Policy Determinants of Minimum Wage Compliance, Perspectives on Politics, 14 PERSPS. ON
POL. 324, 339 (2016) (finding that enhanced penalties correlated with increased compliance with
the minimum wage).
10. Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing: Constitutionality and Effectiveness,
53 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 529–33 (2016) [hereinafter Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing].
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with less.”11 New governance scholarship, too, critiques the “commandand-control” model of regulation that sets rigid standards of conduct and
punishment as ineffective for governmental agencies with insufficient
resources to compel diverse regulated entities into compliance.12 For
information disclosure strategies, such as those requiring financial
disclosure, product labeling, or toxic pollution reporting, behavioral law
and economics scholarship has cast doubt on their ability to fix harmful
market information asymmetries based on the faulty assumptions about
how people make sense of information.13 In other words, even
regulations born out of hope and optimism can often result in regulatory
failure.14
This Article does not, however, conclude that efforts to combat wage
theft should rule out state and local regulation. Given the current hostile
federal climate, local advocacy may hold the most promise for
addressing issues confronting low-wage workers. Movements, often
with workers in the lead, are driving this state and local reform.
Challenging the imbalance of power between employers and workers,
these movements can empower low-wage workers while providing them

11. Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 323, 353 (2005); see, e.g.,
Claire B. Wofford, The Effect of Gender and Relational Distance on Plaintiff Decision Making in
the Litigation Process, L. & SOC’Y REV. 966, 968–69 (2017) (explaining the effects of education,
knowledge of the legal system, and demographics, including income, gender, and race).
12. Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace
Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1091–93 (2005) [hereinafter Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory];
Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV.
819, 822 (2008). While there is no single definition of “command-and-control” regulation, it usually
involves the state setting rules or standards for private actors and enforcing those rules through
inspections or “sometimes with the help of private attorneys general.” Solomon, supra, at 821–22;
see also James E. Krier & Richard B. Stewart, Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental
Law: The Example of Common Law Rules, 1 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13, 15 n.3 (1980)
(defining command-and-control as a “regulatory approach [that] typically proceeds by imposing
rigid standards of conduct . . . backed up by sanctions designed to assure full compliance with such
standards”).
13. See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1113–19 (2007) (discussing the limitations of disclosure in securities
regulation); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
203–07 (2006) (describing judgment errors and departures from expected utility theory); Susanna
Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive
Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 147–48 (2006) (arguing that overly
complex or lengthy disclosures, cognitive biases, and decision-making constraints limit the utility of
securities disclosures as a means of regulating the industry); David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of
Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 156 (2006) (considering the
effectiveness of financial disclosure, nutritional labeling, workplace hazard communications, and
other transparency systems).
14. ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND
PRACTICE 68 (2d ed. 2011).
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with an opportunity to tangibly address their subordination by more
powerful employers.15
Rather, this Article argues that this incredible momentum can be
harnessed to think differently about regulatory strategies. First, it
identifies a handful of less common anti-wage theft strategies that are
more likely to be successful because they avoid the erroneous
assumptions about the behavior of employers and workers underlying
conventional regulatory strategies. Second, worker movements can push
agencies to reconceive of their approach and make existing anti-wage
theft strategies more effective by differentiating between employers and
increasing cooperation with employer networks and worker
organizations. Finally, anti-wage theft legislation is unlikely to be
enacted in certain jurisdictions and, even if enacted, will have little
impact in places where it will not be robustly enforced. Particularly in
these places, the work to support, create, or expand nongovernmental
advocacy that involves worker or consumer organizing to fight wage
theft becomes more significant.
This Article starts with a brief overview of wage theft in Part I. In
particular, it describes the moral and economic crisis of wage theft and
the likely causes for the epidemic.16 Part II summarizes the findings
from our review of wage theft laws passed by states and localities from
2005 to 2017, based on the activist movements that have responded to
the crisis. By creating a typology, we categorize the most common antiwage theft strategies contained within these laws. Part III then analyzes
how these common strategies may fare given the broader context of
regulatory failure. Many of these common strategies frequently fail in
other contexts.17 At the same time, this Article identifies several
promising anti-wage theft strategies that avoid the problematic
assumptions associated with these failed strategies. Given the potential
disappointment of many anti-wage theft laws, Part IV concludes with
thoughts about how agencies can change their approach to avoid the
pitfalls of regulatory failure. As not all local jurisdictions will be able to
either enact or succeed with anti-wage theft regulatory strategies, it also
looks briefly beyond regulation to the possibility of nongovernmental
advocacy.

15. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of the Los
Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2006).
16. While more highly-paid professional workers also suffer from wage theft, this Article focuses
on low-wage workers who are disproportionately impacted by wage theft.
17. This Article focuses on the goal of reducing wage theft. Other legitimate perspectives might
view compensating victims or increasing access to justice as ways to meaningfully address wage theft.
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Wage theft is a serious moral and economic problem that impacts
workers, communities, and the broader economy.18 Wage theft is the
illegal non-payment or underpayment of wages in violation of wage and
hour law or contract law.19 It can take many forms, including: (1) paying
less than the minimum, promised, or overtime wage; (2) taking
unauthorized deductions from a worker’s pay;20 or (3) failing to pay for
all hours worked.21 Because wage and hour or contract law can also
regulate the payment of promised wages, wage theft encompasses more
than the failure to the pay minimum wage.22 Employers use various
tactics to commit wage theft, which can confuse workers about whether
they are, in fact, receiving lawful wages.23
For low-wage workers, the population that suffers the brunt of wage
theft, the harms are especially troubling. Even when paid properly, fulltime minimum wage earners receive pay as low as $15,080 annually24—
an amount below the federal poverty guideline for a household of a
single parent and child.25 For individuals and families already struggling

18. Wage theft is not a term without controversy. Since wage theft can include a violation of civil
law that does not require a showing of intentionality, some contend that the term is misleading
because it encompasses non-criminal acts. See Daniel Schwartz, “Wage Theft”: The Trendy Phrase
that May Not Mean What You Think It Means, CONN. EMP’T L. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2014),
https://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2014/04/articles/wage-theft-the-trendy-phrase-that-runsamok/ [https://perma.cc/9TYJ-YZJA].
19. Wage and hour law is the body of federal, state, and local law that establishes and regulates
wage requirements. The federal wage and hour law is the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–209 (2018). Among other things, it requires that employers pay covered
employees a minimum wage and overtime premium for all hours worked over forty hours in a
workweek.
20. Deductions can include an employer keeping tips or requiring workers to pay out of pocket
for work-related items, such as gas, equipment rental, uniforms, or other supplies necessary to
perform the job.
21. KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE NOT
GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 23–39 (2011) (providing a comprehensive
description of the ways employers commit wage theft).
22. Id.
23. These tactics range from paying a daily or weekly wage, which can confuse workers about
their proper hourly rates and right to overtime pay, to requiring workers to work outside of the hours
recorded on their timesheets. See id.
24. This number is based on the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour and a weekly schedule
of forty hours.
25. U.S. Federal Poverty Guidelines Used to Determine Financial Eligibility for Certain Federal
Programs, OFF. ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION (Jan. 11, 2019),
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to make ends meet, a withheld or reduced paycheck can result in a
missed rent or child support payment, the inability to buy gas or pay bus
fare to get to school or work, and food insecurity.26 Wage theft can have
psychological and emotional impacts, too, resulting in feelings of anger,
anxiety, and powerlessness.27
Unsurprisingly, wage theft results in increased poverty rates. An
Employment Policy Institute (EPI) study from 2017 found that workers
who experience minimum wage violations are more than three times as
likely to live in poverty as someone chosen at random in the eligible
workforce.28 A 2011 U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) study, which
focused on California and New York, found that minimum wage
violations decreased family income to below the poverty line for
anywhere from 7,000 to 41,000 families and 8,000 to 26,000 families in
each state, respectively.29
Further, wage theft harms state and local economies. The same 2011
DOL study found that wage theft annually costs the federal government
$113 million in federal income taxes and $238 million in payroll taxes,
as well as $8 million (NY) and $14 million (CA) in state taxes.30 Wage
theft places “downward pressure on wages for similarly skilled
workers . . . in the same industries.”31 At the same time, it creates unfair
competition for law-abiding employers who struggle to compete with
unscrupulous businesses that commit wage theft.32 Overall, underpaid
https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/H9X4-H7FW] (noting the 2019 guideline
of $16,910 for a two-person household).
26. See SANTIAGO ET AL., supra note 6, at 26–29; Marianne Levine, Behind the Minimum Wage
Fight, A Sweeping Failure to Enforce the Law, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2018, 6:51 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/18/minimum-wage-not-enforced-investigation-409644
[https://perma.cc/X6X6-L45D] (quoting Victor Narro stating that low-wage workers may “lose
everything” when deprived of wages they are owed after only one paycheck).
27. SANTIAGO ET AL., supra note 6, at 26–29 (explaining that wage theft compromises the
physical, mental, social, and socio-emotional health of low-wage workers, prevents them from
treating chronic health conditions, induces a negative outlook on life and self-denigration, and
disrupts their family units, leading to strained relationships, divorce, and feelings of guilt).
28. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 14.
29. E. RESEARCH GRP., THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF WAGE VIOLATIONS: ESTIMATES
FOR CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK 48 (2014) (covering fiscal year 2011).
30. Id. at 61–62.
31. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 30.
32. Lauren K. Dasse, Wage Theft in New York: The Wage Theft Prevention Act as a Counter to
an Endemic Problem, 16 CUNY L. REV. 97, 103 (2012) (“[E]thical employers who abide by federal
and state wage and hour laws are at a competitive disadvantage, as they have higher labor costs than
their dishonest competitors who are increasing profits by violating the law.” (footnotes omitted));
Martin Moylan, Wage Theft Hits Lowest Paid Workers Hardest, MPR NEWS (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/03/11/wage-theft-hits-lowest-paid-workers
[https://perma.cc/F6DY-PTWK] (quoting Adam Hansen who describes how intense bidding
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workers also have less money to spend as consumers, which has
negative implications for local economies.33
B.

The Epidemic of Wage Theft

While it is difficult to measure the exact scope of wage theft, recent
studies consistently indicate that the problem is rampant, particularly
among low-wage workers. EPI most recently estimated that 2.4 million
workers in the ten most populous states lose $8 billion annually to
federal or state minimum wage violations.34 The percentage of
minimum-wage eligible workers experiencing violations within each
state varied, ranging from 9.4% to 24.9%.35 For 2013, Daniel Galvin
found that the national rate of federal or state minimum wage violations
averaged 16.9%, which translated into an average earned hourly wage of
$5.92 for those experiencing violations (as opposed to the average
minimum wage of $7.68).36 The 2011 DOL study found that workers
who suffered wage theft lost anywhere from 37.2% to 70.9% as a
percentage of their income.37
The Broken Laws study, which directly surveyed workers, found that
wage theft was pervasive among low-wage workers in New York City,
Chicago, and Los Angeles.38 This study surveyed 4,387 low-wage
workers and found that more than two-thirds of those surveyed had
experienced a pay violation in the past workweek.39 The study also
found the following: (1) 26% of surveyed workers were paid below the
minimum wage in a given work week; (2) 76% of those who worked
overtime were not paid the required time and a half; (3) 70% did not get
any pay at all for work performed outside their regular shift (“off-theclock” work); and (4) 30% of tipped workers were not paid the tipped
worker minimum wage.40
competitions in some industries—in which the lowest bid usually wins—puts “tremendous pressure
on [the companies] to cut corners, to not pay the full amount of wages owed”).
33. See Antonio Avalos & Sean Alley, The Economic Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) in California, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 8–10 (2010) (studying how EITC payments boost
spending in the local economy).
34. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 2.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Galvin, supra note 9, at 330–31.
37. E. RESEARCH GRP., supra note 29, at 43.
38. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2 (2009) [hereinafter BERNHARDT ET AL.,
BROKEN LAWS].
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2–3.
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In particular, wage theft disproportionately impacts low-wage
workers in certain industries.41 Those occupations most impacted by
wage theft include construction workers, caregivers for children and the
elderly, factory workers, landscapers, restaurant staff, cashiers, and
office clerks.42 Overall, studies have found that the highest levels of
wage theft occur in the leisure and hospitality industry,43 particularly
among those who work in food and beverage services.44 A 2011 study of
working conditions for restaurant workers in eight regions across the
country found that 46.3% of those surveyed had experienced overtime
violations.45 A national study of domestic workers that focused on
nannies, housecleaners, and caregivers, revealed that nearly one-quarter
of survey respondents were paid less than the minimum wage. 46 For day
laborers, who can work a variety of temporary jobs in construction,
landscaping, or cleaning services, a national study found that almost half
of those surveyed had experienced wage theft in just the prior two
months.47
Finally, while wage theft impacts everyone,48 it disproportionately
impacts young people, those with less formal education, women, and
workers of color.49 Although more than three quarters of those impacted
by wage theft are U.S. citizens, foreign-born workers, who are not
otherwise naturalized, suffer a higher incidence of wage theft.50 The
Broken Laws study, for example, found that female undocumented
workers had a 47.4% rate of minimum wage violations compared to the

41. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 8; BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38,
at 28–31.
42. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 25; BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38,
at 28–31; E. RESEARCH GRP., supra note 29, at 34–36.
43. E. RESEARCH GRP., supra note 29, at 33.
44. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 26.
45. REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTR. UNITED, BEHIND THE KITCHEN DOOR: A MULTI-SITE STUDY OF
THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY 2 (2011).
46. LINDA BURNHAM & NIK THEODORE, HOME ECONOMICS: THE INVISIBLE AND UNREGULATED
WORLD OF DOMESTIC WORK 18 (2012).
47. ABEL VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, at ii
(2006). Studies in New Jersey, Texas, and Cleveland confirm rampant wage theft among day
laborers. See, e.g., DANIEL KERR & CHRIS DOLE, CHALLENGING EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE: A
STUDY OF THE DAY LABOR INDUSTRY IN CLEVELAND 13 (2001); SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF L.AW,
ALL WORK AND NO PAY: DAY LABORERS, WAGE THEFT, AND WORKPLACE JUSTICE IN NEW
JERSEY 2 (2011); WORKERS DEF. PROJECT, BUILDING AUSTIN, BUILDING INJUSTICE: WORKING
CONDITIONS IN AUSTIN’S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ii (2009).
48. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 15–16.
49. Id. at 15–22.
50. Id. at 20.
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16.1% for U.S.-born female workers.51 Female undocumented workers
also outpaced their male undocumented counterparts, who had minimum
wage violations at the rate of 29.5%.52
C.

The Causes of Wage Theft

Many factors converge to set the stage for wage theft. Employers
have been driven by competitive pressures, government has promoted
deregulation of the workplace, and unions and civil society have been
unable to contain unlawful employer practices.53 Scholars have written
on the diminishing rights of workers resulting from the practice of
employers subcontracting and outsourcing work, the decline of
organized labor, and the increased privatization of workers’ rights.54
While the larger causes of eroding labor standards are outside of the
scope of this Article, this Section focuses narrowly on why wage theft
occurs.
First, enforcement is simply insufficient. Most government agencies
responsible for enforcement allow employers to act with impunity by
failing to adequately enforce existing wage and hour laws. The agencies
may lack motivation or resources to enforce the law.55 A 2018
investigation found that six states lacked a single investigator to
investigate minimum wage violations.56 Of the remaining states, twentysix had no more than ten investigators.57 Employers, too, may cut
corners by underpaying workers in order to economically survive while
also undercapitalizing their business, either deliberately or because they

51. BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38, at 43.
52. Id.
53. Annette Bernhardt et al., An Introduction to the “Gloves-off Economy”, in THE GLOVES-OFF
ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR MARKET 1, 2
(Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Bernhardt et al., An Introduction to the “Glovesoff Economy”, in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY].
54. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE
GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR
MARKET, supra note 53, at 37–42 (discussing the restructuring of the workplace); BOBO, supra note
21, at 22 (noting the decline of unions); Clyde B. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing
Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 733–34
(2004) (discussing the privatization of rights through arbitration agreements).
55. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO STATE
AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT 41, 44 (2001); BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS,
supra note 38, at 52.
56. Levine, supra note 26.
57. Id.
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lack resources.58 As a result of undercapitalizing their businesses, these
employers may either be judgment proof should a worker want to sue for
their unpaid wages, or they may quickly dissolve their businesses in the
face of a worker’s legal action.59 A California study, for example,
showed that employers who refused to settle claims and later became
subject to court judgments for wage theft “were more likely than not to
have suspended, forfeited, cancelled, or dissolved business status within
a year of the wage claim.”60
Second, employers may engage in wage theft because they correctly
believe that workers will not make claims about unpaid wages. Workers
may not complain because there are insufficient avenues readily
available to file complaints. Workers may also be reluctant to exercise
their rights.61 Given the imbalance of power between employers and
workers in the low-wage workplace, employers can dictate the terms and
conditions of the job because employers have the option of readily hiring
replacement workers.62 While many laws prohibit it, workers who
complain about wage violations may nonetheless experience retaliation
in the form of decreased hours and pay, increased workloads, and
termination.63 Immigrant workers may also be afraid of being reported to
immigration authorities if they complain.64 Those who are willing to
complain may want to act but have little access to worker centers,
nonprofit attorneys, or private attorneys to assist them with taking legal
action.65 Complaint processes also take a long time so that workers may
believe it is not worth their time. As one Arkansas official
acknowledged: “[o]ften . . . by the time the labor standards division is
58. BOBO, supra note 21, at 53; EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO ET AL., HOLLOW VICTORIES: THE CRISIS
13 (2013).
59. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 111.
60. CHO ET AL., supra note 58, at 2.
61. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., CONFRONTING THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: AMERICA’S
BROKEN LABOR STANDARDS AND HOW TO FIX THEM 26–27 (2009).
62. BOBO, supra note 21, at 59; see also Shannon Gleeson & Roberto G. Gonzales, When Do
Papers Matter? An Institutional Analysis of Undocumented Life in the United States, 50 INT’L
MIGRATION 7 (2012) (discussing how undocumented workers fear that they will be easily replaced).
63. BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38, at 24–25.
64. Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for
Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 580 (2010).
65. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 31; JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS:
ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM 78 (2006) [hereinafter FINE, WORKER
CENTERS]. Worker centers are usually community-based organizations that provide support to
marginalized low-wage workers. Centers vary in their size and structures, but frequently provide
workplace rights trainings, a safe space for workers to congregate and organize, as well as
assistance when rights are violated. Some worker centers operate hiring halls from which workers
can be hired.
IN COLLECTING UNPAID WAGES FOR CALIFORNIA’S WORKERS
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ready to take up a case, the worker is ‘very frustrated with us’ and tells
[me] to forget about it.”66
Third, wage theft can occur because parties lack adequate
information. Many workers simply do not know their rights under the
law or may be unaware of how or where to file complaints about unpaid
wages.67 Immigrant workers, in particular, may be unfamiliar with US
laws and legal processes and therefore unaware of their rights and
remedies.68 Some employers may themselves lack sufficient information
and not understand their legal obligations.69 Further, employers’ failure
to keep adequate records can also facilitate wage theft.70 An employer’s
failure to keep records that account for workers’ hours or pay make it
difficult for workers to both recognize and prove wage theft.71
Finally, some employers seek to minimize their legal liability by
strategically structuring their businesses and thereby creating an
environment ripe for wage theft.72 One widespread form of this
phenomenon is called the “fissured workplace.”73 Large corporations,
often at the top of the supply chain, seek to shed their role as direct
employers in favor of outsourcing work to smaller companies,
contractors, or temporary staffing agencies.74 By keeping workers at
arm’s length, the employer may more easily evade legal liability or keep
their true identity and place of business hidden so that workers will have
difficulty holding them liable for wage theft.75 The smaller companies,
66. Levine, supra note 26.
67. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 21; FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at
74–75.
68. SAN DIEGO STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF SOCIOLOGY ET AL., CONFRONTING WAGE THEFT:
BARRIERS TO CLAIMING UNPAID WAGES IN SAN DIEGO 10 (2017).
69. BOBO, supra note 21, at 23.
70. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 99–100. Payroll records are usually required
by federal or state wage and hour law. BOBO, supra note 21, at 40.
71. Without such records, employers sometimes even go so far as to deny that they ever
employed the worker. See generally Richard F. Bruen, Jr., Minimum Wage Law Claims When
Employers Haven’t Kept Accurate Records, 85 ILL. B.J. 281 (1997).
72. Another widespread phenomenon is employers misclassifying workers as independent
contractors and treating them as though they are non-employees and thus outside the protection of
the law. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 4.
73. DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT: A
REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 9–10 (2010), https://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/
strategicEnforcement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6D69-D8R2]
[hereinafter
WEIL, IMPROVING
WORKPLACE CONDITIONS].
74. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55, at 83–84; FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note
65, at 101–02.
75. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that “unscrupulous employers” will often
use the “‘fissured’ nature of the employer-employee relationship to . . . avoid responsibility” when
those employees wish to bring claims regarding mistreatment).
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contractors, or temp agencies may be undercapitalized or may be fly-bynight operations that are difficult to hold accountable.76 These larger
employers, however, are ultimately responsible for driving wage theft as
they exert downward pressure on subcontractors to reduce labor costs.77
II.

RECENT WAVE OF ANTI-WAGE THEFT LEGISLATION

A.

The Success of Worker Movements
Figure 1:
States and Localities Enacting Anti-Wage Theft

Enacted Law(s):
State level
1-2 Localities
3-5 Localities
6-10 Localities
10+ Localities

Over roughly the past decade, worker movements have sought to
address the wage theft crisis by passing state and local laws. A total of
141 laws have been enacted, including seventy state laws and seventyone local ordinances, by twenty-four states and fifty-seven localities
from 2005 to 2018 (Figure 1).
We identified all state and local anti-wage theft laws enacted from
January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2017, using various methods.78 Such
76. See CHO ET AL., supra note 58, at 8–12.
77. David Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces: The US Experience, 22
ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 33, 37, 39–40 (2011) [hereinafter Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in
Fissured Workplaces].
78. Starting in 2005, the public began discussing “wage theft.” NIK THEODORE, THE MOVEMENT
TO END WAGE THEFT: A REPORT TO THE DISCOUNT FOUNDATION 22 (2011) (noting that the term
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methods included referring to sources that cataloged anti-wage theft
laws,79 examining media accounts using Google and Lexis, speaking
with twenty-nine worker centers and state and local departments of
labor,80 and running searches on Westlaw, American Legal Publishing,
and the Municipal Code Corporation for all the states and the thirty most
populous cities.81 Our definition of anti-wage theft laws included any
law that regulates the payment of wages or information related to the
payment of wages.82 Because the aim was to collect laws that explicitly
address wage theft, we excluded laws that solely increase the minimum
wage rate without any accompanying anti-wage theft strategies, address
solely the misclassification of workers as independent contractors, or
require paid sick leave.83
During this period, worker movements expended substantial resources
to engage in state and local level advocacy with good results. Local
reform has the potential to provide impacted workers with more direct
access to the government and can more readily allow for
experimentation.84 Given the minimum wage movement across the
“wage theft” first began to appear in news articles in 2005). Beginning in 2005, a larger number of
anti-wage theft laws were enacted. While we searched comprehensively, our compilation may not
be exhaustive of all state and local laws enacted during this time period.
79. See generally NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 55; TIA KOONZE ET AL., ENFORCING
CITY MINIMUM WAGE LAWS IN CALIFORNIA: BEST PRACTICES AND CITY-STATE PARTNERSHIPS
(2015); Galvin, supra note 9, at 324.
80. List is on file with the authors.
81. To identify such laws on Westlaw, we used the following search phrases: “unpaid wage,”
“wage claim,” “wage complaint,” or “payment /s wage,” or “underpayment /s wage” or “wage /s
theft.” On American Legal Publishing and the Municipal Code Corporation, the search phrase was
“wage.” The thirty most populous cities and their corresponding counties were determined by
number of residents using U.S. Census data.
82. These laws are sometimes focused on a particular subset of workers, such as domestic
workers, day laborers, or “temp” workers.
83. Other laws were excluded if they: (1) made only technical revisions to the law and did not
fundamentally change the enforcement regime; (2) would be considered pro-employer provisions;
(3) exclusively governed work performed pursuant to city contracts; or (4) were subsequently
repealed, preempted by state statute, or otherwise invalidated.
84. Localities that sit in states that disagree with such anti-wage theft laws may seek to preempt
them. MARNI VON WILPERT, CITY GOVERNMENTS ARE RAISING STANDARDS FOR WORKING
PEOPLE—AND STATE LEGISLATORS ARE LOWERING THEM BACK DOWN 2–3 (2017),
https://www.epi.org/publication/city-governments-are-raising-standards-for-working-people-andstate-legislators-are-lowering-them-back-down/ [https://perma.cc/UH33-GZXF]. Some localities are
fighting back, however, by claiming impermissible infringement on their home-rule powers or
raising constitutional violations. See, e.g., City of Dayton v. State, 151 Ohio St. 3d 168, 2017-Ohio6909, 87 N.E.3d 176, at ¶ 28 (finding that the state law seeking to preempt the city ordinances
related to traffic cameras violates municipal home-rule authority); Amended Complaint, Lewis v.
Bentley, No. 16-cv-00690-RDP (N.D. Ala. 2017), ECF No. 18 (challenging state preemption of a
municipal minimum wage ordinance as discriminatory on the basis of race).
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country, a number of the identified anti-wage theft laws seek to increase
the minimum wage.85 Low-wage workers have directly led many of
these efforts, along with the participation of community-based
organizations, worker centers, legal services agencies, and unions. In the
District of Columbia, for example, the Wage Theft Coalition, which
included nonprofits, unions, social service providers, worker centers, and
community organizations, led the campaign to get an anti-wage theft law
enacted.86
Political conditions may influence whether worker movements can
succeed in passing an anti-wage theft law.87 For those states enacting
anti-wage theft legislation, a solid majority (67%) of the jurisdictions
lean Democratic.88 For localities enacting anti-wage theft legislation, the
overwhelming majority (96%) of jurisdictions lean Democratic.89
Another study, in examining anti-wage theft laws at the state level from
2004 to 2012, found that movement strength and political conditions
predicted the success of enacting them.90 In particular, they found that
political conditions could trump or diminish movement strength.91 While
we cannot say with certainty that a Democratic-leaning jurisdiction is a
precondition to getting anti-wage theft laws enacted, this finding raises
questions about the feasibility, particularly in less progressive local
jurisdictions, of getting such laws enacted in the future.
85. Minimum Wage Tracker, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.epi.org/minimumwage-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/X7W7-FKUQ].
86. THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR COMBATTING WAGE THEFT:
LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 17 (2017). Like in D.C., coalitions across the country have had success in
enacting laws to address wage theft. See, e.g., THEODORE, supra note 78, at 8–9, 17 (describing
efforts by Casa Latina in Seattle and the Washington State Labor Council to reform laws in Seattle
and Washington); BOBO, supra note 21, at 220 (describing the coalition that pushed the MiamiDade County anti-wage theft ordinance).
87. While we recognize the limitations of this approach, we defined a jurisdiction to be “leaning
Democratic” by whether the majority had voted for Hilary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election.
88. In our study, twenty-four states enacted anti-wage theft laws, and sixteen of those were in
jurisdictions that lean Democratic.
89. In our study, fifty-six localities enacted anti-wage theft laws, and fifty-four of those were in
jurisdictions that lean Democratic.
90. Marc Doussard & Ahmad Gamal, The Rise of Wage Theft Laws: Can Community-Labor
Coalitions Win Victories in State Houses?, 52 URB. AFF. REV. 780, 797 (2015). Doussard and
Gamal studied anti-wage theft laws enacted at the state level from 2004 to 2012 but had a broader
definition of which laws addressed wage theft. Id. at 784.
91. Id. at 797. Doussard and Gamal note that while some states that are “hostile to the interests of
workers” enacted bills, such bills were extremely limited. Id. at 800. We similarly note that a good
number of the state laws we examined in Republican-leaning jurisdictions do not utilize many antiwage theft strategies. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1201 to 48-1209, 48-1228 to 48-1234 (2019)
(amending the existing law to solely include a requirement that employers provide pay stubs with
specified information).
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The Most Common Anti-Wage Theft Strategies

The 141 anti-wage theft laws varied in approach and scope. The more
comprehensive laws have variations of the following components:
A process for workers to complain in court or with an
administrative agency;
A prohibition against retaliating;
Authority for an agency or court to determine whether wage theft
occurred and order payment of damages;
Authority for an agency or court to find multiple employers
jointly liable; and
Requirements that employers keep or provide information (e.g.,
post a notice about workers’ rights, keep payroll records).
Based on these core components, we developed a typology (Table 1).
The overall categories are: (1) authorizing worker complaints;
(2) strengthening anti-retaliation provisions; (3) creating or enhancing
penalties; (4) expanding employer liability; and (5) regulating
information. Within each of these categories, we noted the twenty-two
most common anti-wage theft strategies employed by state and local
laws.92

92. A variety of miscellaneous strategies occurred less frequently and thus were not included.
Some examples of these less frequently utilized strategies include: (1) stop work orders;
(2) increasing the jurisdictional limits of the agencies authorized to enforce wage theft laws; and
(3) encouraging mediation.
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Table 1:
Typology of Anti-Wage Theft Strategies
Worker
Complaints
Private Right
of Action

AntiRetaliation
Prohibiting
Retaliation

Penalties
Civil

Administrative Confidential
Processes
Complaint

License
Revocation

Increases or
Tolls Statute
of Limitations

Negative
Publicity

Burden
Shifting

Expanded
Liability
Broader
Definition
of
Employer
Successor
Liability

Information
Requirements
Mandatory
Disclosures

Joint and
Several
Liability

Posters

Criminal
Lien
Bond

Employer
Recordkeeping

Burden
Shifting
Agency Data
Collection or
Reporting
Worker
Education
Employer
Education

The extent to which these new laws employ each category of
strategies varied, with penalties being the most popular and expanded
liability being the least common (Figure 2).
Figure 2:
Frequency of Anti-Wage Theft Categories

Worker Complaints
Anti-Retaliation
Penalties
Expanded Liability
Information Requirement
0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Percentage of Laws Examined
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Within the 141 newly enacted laws,93 we determined the frequency of
each of the twenty-two anti-wage theft strategies.94 We provide a more
detailed picture below.
1.

Worker Complaints

Less than half (40%) of the laws examined facilitate or authorize
workers to sue in court or initiate an administrative enforcement
process.95 Of these laws, the breakdown between different kinds of
worker complaint strategies are:
Table 2:
Worker Complaint Strategies
43%
41%
16%

Permits Private Right of Action
Permits Administrative Complaint Process
Increases or Tolls Statute of Limitations

Almost half (43%) of the worker complaint strategies consist of
creating a private right of action. A similar percentage (41%) create an
administrative system in which workers, or others acting on their behalf,
can file their claims and have the agency investigate or adjudicate their
claims.96 A number of the laws have both private rights of action and
administrative complaint processes so workers can choose between
them.97
Further, a smaller handful (16%) of worker complaint strategies seek
to increase the ability of workers to file or maintain a worker complaint
by extending or tolling the statute of limitations. Most of these laws toll
the statute of limitations while workers’ complaints are pending with an

93. Because our research focused solely on newly enacted laws, our data does not include laws in
place prior to 2005. However, where those preexisting laws were subsequently amended by laws
enacted from 2005 to 2018, we did include those amendments.
94. During the period studied, some jurisdictions enacted a single comprehensive law that
adopted many strategies at once while others passed several laws and made reforms in a more
piecemeal fashion. Because we found it significant that these jurisdictions enacted laws to create or
strengthen these strategies, we counted each strategy separately.
95. We only counted those laws that either authorized worker complaints or explicitly set forth that
regulations would be promulgated to create an administrative process. Thus, if an agency created a
process for worker complaints purely through regulation, it would not be captured by our data.
96. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-15-1 to 50-15-7 (West 2019) (providing that a state agency
shall investigate complaints and enforce the Day Laborer Act).
97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-4-101, 109, 111, 113, 118 (2019) (providing that a worker
can bring an administrative complaint for wages up to $7,500 or file a civil suit in court).
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administrative agency.98 This tolling allows for workers to preserve their
full claims if they choose to thereafter file court complaints event if the
statute of limitations would have otherwise run on some or all of their
claims during the pendency of an administrative complaint and
investigation. Only a few of these laws increase the overall statute of
limitations for filing a worker complaint.99
2.

Anti-Retaliation

A little less than half (43%) of the laws create or strengthen
protections for workers or others who take action against wage theft. Of
these laws, the breakdown between different kinds of anti-retaliation
strategies are:
Table 3:
Anti-Retaliation Strategies
55%
23%
22%

Prohibits Retaliation
Permits Confidential Complaint
Burden Shifting for Firing Worker

A little more than half (55%) of anti-retaliation strategies address
employer retaliation by prohibiting retaliation against workers who have
voiced or filed complaints.100 Some of these laws also provide that
workers may seek monetary penalties for retaliation through an
administrative agency or a court.101 A number of laws also extend the
prohibition against retaliation beyond the employer to include others
acting on the employer’s behalf.102 Other laws protect individuals
helping to enforce the anti-wage theft law by, for example, testifying on
behalf of an aggrieved worker or educating workers about their rights.103
98. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 150 (West 2019) (permitting tolling of the statute
of limitations while agency complaint is pending).
99. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:51(V) (2019) (extending the statute of limitations from
eighteen to thirty-six months).
100. These jurisdictions, for example, protect the voicing of complaints: N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-f
(McKinney 2019); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.20.035 (2019); and D.C. CODE. ANN. § 321311 (West 2019).
101. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-362 to 22-364 (2019) (providing that workers may
recover damages including interest, double unpaid wages, and attorney fees and costs).
102. See, e.g., MILPITAS, CAL., CODE § III-31-8.00(a) (2019) (prohibiting retaliation by employer
or any other party).
103. See, e.g., id. (protecting individuals who have educated others about their rights); BELMONT, CAL.,
CODE § 32-6(a) (2019) (protecting workers who have filed a complaint, participated in any proceeding,
used any civil remedies to enforce their rights, or otherwise asserted any right under the law).
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Just less than a quarter (23%) of anti-retaliation strategies involve a
process where workers can file complaints confidentially, although
many of these laws permit disclosure if necessary to investigate or
resolve a complaint.104 Finally, a similar amount (22%) of strategies shift
the burden of proving a non-retaliatory motive to the employer in cases
alleging retaliation if the worker was fired within ninety days after
complaining.105 A couple of laws alternatively shift the burden by
prohibiting the firing of a worker within 120 days after the worker has
raised a complaint without clear and convincing evidence that the
discharge is warranted.106
3.

Penalties

Just less than three-quarters (73%) of the laws examined authorize an
administrative agency or court to impose penalties when it finds that an
employer committed wage theft.107 Of these laws, the breakdown
between the different kinds of penalty strategies are:
Table 4:
Penalty Strategies
47%
23%
11%
10%
5%
4%

Civil
License Revocation
Negative Publicity
Criminal
Lien
Bond

Civil penalties authorize the court or an administrative agency to
impose monetary penalties against an employer. Roughly half (47%) of
the strategies involving penalties create or enhance civil penalties. Most
laws calculate civil penalties based on the amount of wages owed (e.g.,
an equivalent amount to wages owed), although a few have alternate

104. See, e.g., D.C. CODE. ANN. § 32-1306(a-1) (West 2019) (permitting confidentiality of the
name and other identifying information of the complainant).
105. See, e.g., PALO ALTO, CAL., CODE § 4.62.070(b) (2019) (creating rebuttable presumption of
retaliation for adverse action taken within ninety days of complaining).
106. See, e.g., SAN MATEO, CAL., CODE § 5.92.050(d)(1) (2019) (prohibiting termination within
120 days of protected activity unless clear and convincing evidence there was just cause).
107. See Irene Lurie, Enforcement of State Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws: Resources,
Procedures, and Outcomes, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 411, 426 (2011) (describing how some
agencies must refer the wage theft case to a court in order to get penalties issued against an employer).
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formulas.108 For the most part, the employer pays the penalties to the
worker, although, in some jurisdictions, a portion go to the
administrative agency.109 For willful violations by repeat offenders,
some laws authorize the imposition of higher civil penalties.110 In
addition, some civil penalties include the prevailing worker’s attorney’s
fees, costs, or the cost of administrative enforcement.111
License revocation penalties authorize the non-issuance, suspension,
or revocation of the license of an employer that committed wage theft.
About a quarter (23%) of the strategies involving penalties provide for
license revocation, ranging from a general business license to more
specific licenses necessary to operate the employer’s business, such as a
land use permit.112 The authority for license revocation lies with the
agency in charge of issuing such licenses.113
Negative publicity penalties (11%) require reporting to the public
about employers who have committed wage theft. The location for
sharing such information varies, from agency websites to notices posted
at the employer’s place of business.114
Only a small minority (10%) of the strategies involving penalties
authorizes criminal charges against an employer. These laws define
wage theft as a misdemeanor or felony with accompanying fines or jail
time.115 Criminal liability frequently requires that the employer
knowingly or intentionally engaged in wage theft.116
108. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-4-109 to 8-4-110 (2019) (providing that civil penalties are
calculated with a “daily earnings” penalty for an employer’s failure to pay wages within fourteen
days of demand and a 50% greater penalty for willful violations).
109. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/12 (West 2019) (providing that where an
employer is found liable and acted willfully, repeatedly, or recklessly, that employer must pay up to
20% of the wages owed to the employee to the agency).
110. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.48.125(1) (2019) (increasing penalties for willful violators).
111. See, e.g., ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE §§ 15-42, 15-45(b) (2019) (including within civil
penalties: attorney’s fees, costs, and costs to the city for the administrative cost of handling the
complaint).
112. See e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/70 (revoking day or temporary labor agency
registration); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 5.92.050(F) (2019) (regarding approval of land use permits).
113. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.99.090 (2019) (providing that “city agencies or
departments may revoke or suspend any registration certificates, permits or licenses held or
requested by the Employer . . .”).
114. In New York, the agency can post information about employers who have committed an
“egregious violation” of the wage theft law. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 219-c(3) (McKinney 2019). In San
Francisco, the employer itself is required to post a notice if it fails to comply with an order to pay
back wages or penalties. S.F., CAL., CODE § 12R.7(f) (2019).
115. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-288, 31-69(a), 31-76(a) (2019) (providing that an
employer’s failure to pay legally required or promised wages is a class D felony).
116. See, e.g., D.C. CODE. ANN. § 32-1307(a) (West 2019) (requiring negligent or willful
conduct); DENVER, CO, CODE § 38-51.8 (2019) (requiring knowing conduct).
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Lien penalties authorize the filing of a lien or levy against the
employer’s property for wages or penalties owed.117 Only a handful of
the strategies involving penalties (5%) authorize a lien against their
personal or real property.
Bond penalties require employers to post a bond (4%). Such bonds
may be required for all employers in high-risk industries who must
obtain specialized licensing or more specifically as penalties for
employers who have committed wage theft.118
4.

Expanded Liability

A small minority (19%) of the laws examined contain strategies to
expand the number of employers ultimately liable for unpaid wages. Of
them, the breakdown between the different kinds of expanded liability
strategies are:
Table 5:
Expanded Liability Strategies
38%
34%
28%

Broader Definition of Employer
Successor Liability
Joint and Several Liability

Expanded liability strategies seek to address challenges of regulating
the fissured workplace and authorize workers to seek their wages from
multiple joint employers.119 More than one third (38%) hold entities
directly liable for a worker’s wages if they “use” or “subcontract” the
services of that worker’s direct employer.120 Another third (34%) permit
employees of companies that have either dissolved or disappeared to
hold successor entities with a similar operation liable for wage theft.121

117. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-1101 to 3-1110 (West 2019) (authorizes a
lien for unpaid wages).
118. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.104.060 (2019) (authorizing city to require a bond
before providing a certificate of occupancy for construction projects).
119. Employers are joint employers when both employers employ the employee, making both
jointly and severally liable for the payment of wages.
120. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415 (2019) (stating that “[a]ny person who uses the services
of a labor contractor” can be held “personally and jointly and severally liable” for the wages of the
contractor’s workers). In California, general contractors are liable for nonpayment of wages by
subcontractors, but not for penalties and liquidated damages. CAL. LAB. CODE § 218.7 (West 2019).
121. See, e.g., L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 8.101.050 (2019) (creating successor liability where,
at the time of the conveyance of the business, the successor had knowledge of the wage theft and the
amount of the Wage Enforcement Order).

09 - Lee & Smith.docx (Do Not Delete)

782

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

5/30/2019 10:38 AM

[Vol. 94:759

Finally, more than a quarter (28%) authorize administrative agencies or
courts more generally to find joint and several liability among multiple
employers.122
5.

Information Requirements

Half (50%) of the laws regulate information in an effort to increase
awareness about wage and hour laws or to enhance transparency
regarding an employer’s payment of wages. Of these laws, the
breakdown between the different kinds of information requirements are:
Table 6:
Information Strategies
23%
21%
19%
12%
10%
10%
4%

Mandatory Disclosures
Employer Recordkeeping
Posters
Burden Shifting for Lack of Records
Agency Data Collection or Reporting
Worker Education
Employer Education

Slightly less than half (42%) of the information strategies require
employers to make disclosures to workers. Less than a quarter (23%) of
these disclosures require employers to make extensive mandatory
disclosures directly to workers at the time of hire. These disclosures
include the employee’s specific pay rate and hours worked each pay
period, the employer’s name and address, or instructions on how to file
an administrative wage complaint.123 Similarly, about a fifth (19%) of
information strategies require that employers display a poster at the
worksite about the rights of workers under the anti-wage theft law.124 A
good portion of these posting requirements specify that information must
be provided in languages other than English.125 Under some laws, the

122. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96.8, 98, 238.1–238.5, 538.1 (West 2019) (creating joint
liability for entities who contract for service in the property services and long-term care industries).
123. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.20.025(D) (2019) (requiring employers to
disclose information about the employer and payment of wages at the time of hire); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 658.440(1)(f) (2019) (contractor must provide information about the job upon hire).
124. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 448.109 (2019) (requiring employers to hang posters in the
workplace regarding employees’ minimum wage rights).
125. See, e.g., FLAGSTAFF, ARIZ., CODE § 15-01-001-0004(A) (2019) (requiring postings in English,
Spanish, and any language spoken by at least 5% of the employees at the workplace or job site).
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failure of employers to post or provide information to workers subjects
employers to a penalty.126
A little more than a fifth (21%) of information strategies create or
enhance employers’ recordkeeping requirements. In particular,
employers are required to record and retain information, such as
employees’ hours, pay rates, and pay, and may be penalized for failing
to do so.127 A smaller percentage (12%) of these strategies shift the
burden to the employer for proving the proper payment of wages when
the employer fails to maintain or provide access to required records.128
A small percentage (10%) of information strategies require state or
local agencies to either report about their enforcement system (such as
the occurrences of wage theft or implementation of the anti-wage theft
law by the agency) or collect information directly from employers about
their payroll.129 A similarly small portion of information strategies direct
state and local agencies to educate workers (10%) or employers (4%).130
III. LIMITATIONS OF COMMON ANTI-WAGE THEFT
STRATEGIES
Given the incredible momentum that exists to change state and local
policies to address wage theft and the seriousness of the problem, it is
critical to examine whether the anti-wage theft strategies being advanced
by these laws are likely to succeed. Using the above typology, this Part
examines the underlying assumptions of how the anti-wage theft
strategies are supposed to operate in practice. Many of the most common
anti-wage theft strategies resemble popular, but failed, regulatory
strategies in other contexts, such as rights claiming, command and
control enforcement, and information disclosure. This Article concludes
that such strategies are unlikely to significantly reduce wage theft. At the
same time, we note several less common anti-wage theft strategies that
may be more successful in directly addressing some of the problematic
assumptions in popular regulatory strategies.

126. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-364(F) (2019) (mandating penalty for failure to
comply with recordkeeping or posting requirements).
127. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 652.409, 652.610, 652.750 (2019) (requiring employers to
maintain time and pay records for three years after an employee’s termination).
128. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 2018-36, ch. 20½, § 20½-4(c)(6) (2019)
(shifting the burden of proof onto the employer when the employer fails to maintain payroll records).
129. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 658.405 (2019) (requiring employers to submit certified copies
of payroll records).
130. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 190(O) (West 2019) (requiring education of
domestic workers and their employers, including distribution of model employment agreements).
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Rights-Claiming Strategies

Less than half (40%) of the 141 laws surveyed either provide workers
with the ability to file a complaint with an administrative agency or the
courts or facilitate the filing of such complaints by extending or tolling
the statute of limitations. Despite the popular notion that people litigate
too readily, most do not pursue legal grievances.131 Sociolegal scholars
have extensively studied rights-claiming strategies and have argued that
whether an individual files a complaint “depend[s] on the individual’s
location in the social hierarchy,” with members from more marginalized
groups less likely to seek remedy through the legal system.132 Similarly,
the strategy of worker complaints is questionable because it relies on the
assumption that workers, including immigrant workers,133 will file wage
theft complaints.
Any regulatory strategy premised on worker complaints assumes that
aggrieved parties will engage in the “naming, blaming, [and]
claiming.”134 Tangible traits such as income, education, and knowledge
of the legal system shape whether individuals view their injury as a legal
grievance and decide to take legal action to resolve the problem.135 In
examining the right of individuals to bring a claim under Title VII,
scholars have found a “widespread failure to confront discrimination
publicly[,] . . . driven largely by an accurate perception that the costs of
such responses will likely outweigh the benefits.”136 Empirical studies
have revealed, for example, that less than 1% of African Americans who
reported having suffered race-based discrimination at work filed a
complaint with the EEOC.137 Such Title VII studies have led some to
conclude that the complaint-based model for civil rights enforcement has
largely failed.138

131. Wofford, supra note 11, at 967.
132. Id. at 968.
133. See Kati L. Griffith & Shannon M. Gleeson, The Precarity of Temporality: How Law
Inhibits Immigrant Worker Claims, 39 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 111, 118–20 (2017).
134. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 8, at 631.
135. Wofford, supra note 11, at 967–68.
136. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 900 (2008).
137. Laura Beth Neilsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 704–05 (2005).
138. See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 447
(2007).
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In the context of wage-related laws, scholars and advocates have
similarly critiqued the strategy of worker complaints.139 It is hard to get
workers to “name” wage theft because they often do not understand that
it is happening.140 This “naming” assumption has been powerfully
questioned by Charlotte Alexander and Arthi Prasad in their analysis of
the data from the Broken Laws study.141 They found that only one third
of low-wage workers identified having a wage problem while higher
rates of them were found to actually have a wage theft problem (26%
had not been paid minimum wage and 76% were owed overtime).142 In
general, over half of these workers (59%) did not know their minimum
wage or overtime rights.143 The low-wage workforce faces particular
challenges given the higher incidence of individuals who may not be
familiar with U.S. laws or lack high levels of education.144
Understanding whether wage theft has occurred is often complex. For
example, a worker may not readily understand whether they should have
been paid for time spent taking ten-minute breaks at work or whether
they received the proper rate of overtime pay when paid a daily or
weekly rate.145 Due to rampant misclassification, a worker may also be
misclassified as an independent contractor—incorrectly believing they
are not entitled to the protections of the wage and hour laws afforded to

139. See KOONZE ET AL., supra note 79, at 12–13; DIEGO RONDÓN ICHIKAWA & REBECCA
SMITH, DELIVERING $15: COMMUNITY-CENTERED WAGE AND HOUR ENFORCEMENT IN SEATTLE 4–
7 (2014); Janice Fine, Solving the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing
Labour Standards Non-Compliance in the United States, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813, 820–21
(2013); David Weil, A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection, 147 INT’L LAB. REV. 349, 356
(2008) [hereinafter Weil, A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection].
140. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 8, at 1085.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1093 (citing other studies showing lack of knowledge about the law).
144. Id. at 1088 (finding for every year of education a worker was more likely to have identified a
workplace problem); see also GREGORY ACS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, A PROFILE OF LOW WAGE
WORKERS 5–6 tbl.6 (1999) (showing that in 1997, only 35.5% of low-wage workers and 28.5% of
low-wage/low-income workers had more than twelve years of schooling).
145. A worker, for example, can be paid on a piece rate basis of $100 per day, six days per week,
for a total of $600. The worker might fairly believe that she is getting more than minimum wage
($7.25/hour x 40 hours = $290) and overtime ($10.88/hour x 20 hours = $217.60), which is
incorrect. In fact, she is not receiving overtime as her overtime wages would be calculated by first
establishing her regular rate of pay of $10 ($600 / 60 hours = $10/hour) and requiring the employer
to pay the overtime premium for hours worked over forty ($15/hour x 20 hours = $300). Layered on
top of this analysis is the threshold question of whether the worker’s job places her in a statutory
category where she is, in fact, eligible for overtime.
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employees.146 It is unsurprising, therefore, that workers have a hard time
identifying wage theft.
Even presuming that workers recognize that wage theft is occurring,
they may struggle with “blaming” the correct employers.147 There are
several practical barriers that arise. The fissured workplace makes it
harder for workers to blame the correct parties responsible for their wage
theft.148 Workers may not even know exactly for whom they work, much
less be aware of entities at the top of the supply chain.149 A study of
temporary staffing workers found that they sometimes lacked key
information about their employers, such as the names of the staffing
agency or the host employer.150 Some jobs, such as those involving day
labor, are particularly informal, with workers being picked up on a street
corner or from a parking lot to work for several hours or days.151 In these
situations, aggrieved workers may not have the information needed to
assign blame to the contractor that picked them up, much less the larger
entity that used the contractor for the project.152 With respect to fly-bynight employers, it may be difficult for workers to uncover the existence
of the new successor entity at a new location that comprises essentially
the same employer.153 Some workers may recognize wage theft but are
reluctant to blame their employer because of personal loyalty or belief
that it is one of the inevitable costs of being undocumented.154

146. See, e.g., LINDA H. DONAHUE, JAMES RYAN LAMARE & FRED B. KOTLER, CORNELL UNIV.
ILR SCH., THE COST OF WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE 4–5 tbls.1–7 (2007)
(providing the extent of worker misclassification in New York State based on audits).
147. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 8, at 635–36.
148. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that “unscrupulous employers” will
often use the “‘fissured’ nature” of the employer-employee relationship to avoid responsibility when
those employees wish to bring claims regarding mistreatment).
149. Thomas E. Perez, The Fair Labor Standards Act at Seventy-Seven: Still “Far-Reaching,
Far-Sighted”, 30 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299, 303 (2015).
150. REBECCA DAILY, TRACIE JOHNSON & HOLLY SMITH, SHELLER CENTER FOR SOCIAL
JUSTICE, PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS IN JEOPARDY: THE HIDDEN PROBLEM OF TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT 19–20 (2017).
151. Stephen Franklin, A Day in the Life of a Day Laborer, IN THESE TIMES (June 15, 2017, 3:41
PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/20237/day_laborer_purgatory_waiting_in_the_streets
_to_take_a_backbreaking_job [https://perma.cc/AMC6-N7DS] (illustrating how a group of day
laborers will wait on a street corner for contractors to hire them, often working for those contractors
for little to no money and fearing the sometimes-dangerous working conditions).
152. IMMIGRATION & WORKER’S RIGHTS CLINIC, SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, IRONBOUND
UNDERGROUND: WAGE THEFT & WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS AMONG DAY LABORERS IN NEWARK’S
EAST WARD 11 (2010).
153. CHO ET AL., supra note 58, at 10.
154. Email from Keith Talbot, Senior Counsel, Legal Servs. of N.J. (Dec. 26, 2018, 15:51 CST)
(on file with authors).
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At the “claiming” stage, unpaid workers do not readily complain. A
study by David Weil and Amanda Pyles, which reviewed data from the
DOL, Wage and Hour Division from 2001 to 2004, found an abysmally
low number of workers complained to DOL about wage and hour
violations: approximately 25 out of 100,000 workers.155 Alexander and
Prasad also present evidence that low-wage workers are not likely to
complain for a variety of reasons. Of the workers who recognized the
problem of wage theft in the Broken Laws study, only 57% complained,
with nearly all those filing complaints directly with the employer.156
Only 4% of those who complained opted to do so to the government or
file a lawsuit, with 77% unaware of how to complain to the
government.157 Those who knew how to complain chose not to do so
because they doubted the efficacy of taking action, did not want to take
the time to engage in a lengthy process, and feared retaliation.158
Increased use of forced arbitration as a condition of employment has
created yet another barrier to workers’ enforcement of their wage-related
rights and undermines worker complaint strategies.159
Although nearly half of worker complaint strategies involved creating
a private right of action, workers cannot readily bring claims pro se and
do not have ready access to attorneys.160 Workers may incorrectly
believe that they must have a lawyer to file suit, feel ill-equipped to fill
out the required paperwork and comply with court rules, or simply lack
the time to take legal action.161 They also face incredible barriers to
obtaining an attorney, particularly for representation regarding smaller
wage claims.162 Nonprofit attorneys are constrained by limited resources
and private attorneys are constrained because they need to generate

155.
156.
157.
158.

Weil & Pyles, supra note 8, at 70 tbl.1.
Alexander & Prasad, supra note 8, at 1089.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1089; SAN DIEGO STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF SOC. ET AL., supra note 68, at 7–9;
SHANNON GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF WORKPLACE
PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 14–15 (2016) [hereinafter GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS].
159. See generally Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates
That Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103 (describing the
pervasiveness of arbitration mandates in employment relationships, the limits they place on wage
related rights, including the right to engage in aggregate claims, and the negative impact on lowwage workers). Forced arbitration provisions can also decrease the statute of limitations period to
bring a wage claim. See Imre S. Szalai, The Failure of Legal Ethics to Address the Abuses of Forced
Arbitration, 24 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 127, 142–43 (2018).
160. See GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS, supra note 158, at 95.
161. See, e.g., Ruan, supra note 159, at 1118–19 (discussing the challenges of bringing legal
action to recover “small” wage claims).
162. Id.
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fees.163 Workers may not have the freedom to take time off of work to
visit an attorney during regular office hours or to testify in court.164
There may also be language barriers that restrict a worker’s ability to
communicate with would-be lawyers or to represent herself.165 Although
there are no studies about the frequency with which workers use the
private right of action under the anti-wage laws, one study shows that
when collective or class action lawsuits are already initiated, workers at
the same workplace who are eligible to opt in as plaintiffs do so at an
incredibly low rate.166 Even where unpaid workers overcome these
significant barriers and prevail against employers, the difficulty of
actually collecting judgments is pervasive.167
Finally, worker complaints prevent agencies from focusing resources
on the worst employers. Weil and Pyles found that the industries in
which workers filed complaints were not those with the highest
violations.168 By examining complaints and compliance under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), they found that the complaints filed were imperfectly related to
underlying problems or unrelated to industry-level conditions.169 Worker
complaints are also problematic because they are inherently reactive,
failing to send clear deterrence signals to the employers most deserving
of regulatory scrutiny.170
The anti-wage theft strategy of worker complaints is not, however,
entirely useless. As a matter of increased access to justice, it provides
163. Id.; see also Effective Strategies and Tools for Wage Enforcement: Hearing Before the
Oregon S. Interim Comm. on Workforce & Gen. Gov’t, 2016 Leg., 78th Sess. 4–5 (Or. 2016)
(testimony of Laura Huizar, Staff Att’y, Nat’l Emp. L. Project) [hereinafter Effective Strategies and
Tools for Wage Enforcement]; JACOB MEYER & ROBERT GREENLEAF, ENFORCEMENT OF STATE
WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A SURVEY OF STATE REGULATORS 10 (2011); NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT, supra note 55, at 31.
164. See David Villano, Work-Life Balance Benefits Low-Wage Workers, Employers, PAC.
STANDARD (June 14, 2017), https://psmag.com/economics/work-life-balance-benefits-low-wageworkers-employers-35733 [https://perma.cc/2KQQ-AZ8U] (explaining that low-wage workers are
frequently replaced—with employee turnover rates in some low-paying jobs in excess of 80%—
when they take time off for personal needs).
165. See Sudha Shetty, Equal Justice Under the Law: Myth or Reality for Immigrants and
Refugees?, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 565, 565–66 (2004); Annette Wong, A Matter of Competence:
Lawyers, Courts, and Failing to Translate Linguistic and Cultural Differences, 21 S. CAL. REV. L.
& SOC. JUST. 431, 440–41 (2012).
166. Charlotte S. Alexander, Would an Opt-In Requirement Fix the Class Action Settlement?
Evidence from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 80 MISS. L.J. 443, 446–47 (2010).
167. See, e.g., CHO ET AL., supra note 58, at 13 (describing how “under the current system in
California, workers are left largely on their own to collect in the hardest cases”).
168. Weil & Pyles, supra note 8, at 72–73.
169. Weil, A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection, supra note 139, at 359.
170. Id. at 356, 359–61.
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individual workers with a possible way to obtain redress for lost wages.
In particular, the administrative complaint mechanism aims to increase
access to justice because it is usually designed for pro se workers. The
strategy of extending or tolling the statute of limitations can further help
workers who may have either failed to timely recognize that they were
victims of wage theft or had their administrative complaints languish
with agencies. Further, a handful of laws try to overcome the “naming,
blaming, and claiming” problem by: (1) authorizing coworkers,
individuals, or organizations to come forward on behalf of the aggrieved
worker; (2) notifying the employer’s current employees about an
ongoing investigation; and (3) contracting with community-based
organizations to assist workers with filing complaints.171 Anti-wage theft
and rights-claiming strategies, therefore, serve some legitimate purposes
but are questionable as overall strategies for significantly reducing wage
theft.
B.

Protecting Workers from Retaliation

Nearly half of the anti-wage theft laws passed included antiretaliation provisions. Retaliation in low-wage workplaces is common
and “creates a culture of hopelessness and helplessness” that pervades
the workplace.172 Most workers who choose to speak up or file
complaints about wage theft will want to know that they can do so
without experiencing retaliation or that they have the ability to obtain
reinstatement or compensation if retaliation occurs.173
Most anti-retaliation strategies involve prohibiting retaliation against
workers who voice or file complaints and punishing employers who
retaliate.174 The problem with such strategies is that they fail to
encourage workers to step forward because the anti-retaliation protection
triggers only after the employer has engaged in the harmful act of
retaliation. For an individual worker who is weighing the option of
complaining, the idea that an employer may be punished at some later

171. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 2018-36, ch. 20½, § 20½-4(a)(2)(B) (2019)
(authorizing membership-based entities to be the complainant); L.A., CAL., CODE § 8.101.090(G)
(2019) (contracting with community-based organizations); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 1543(a)(1) (2019) (allowing any person or entity to help file complaints).
172. BRITTANY SCOTT, RAISE THE FLOOR ALLIANCE & NAT’L ECON. & SOC. RTS. INITIATIVE,
CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR 17 (2016) [hereinafter CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF
FEAR]; see also supra notes 62–64.
173. Id. at 28.
174. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 342a, 345, 347–348, 397 (2019) (prohibiting retaliation
and providing that an employee may bring a private action for retaliation).
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point for having engaged in retaliation is often not helpful.175 Even if a
court or agency eventually finds that the employer violated an antiretaliation law and orders back pay damages or reinstatement, it will
likely take months or years to arrive at that decision.176 Further, available
studies suggest that penalties for retaliation are rarely imposed.177 Lowwage workers too frequently lack the savings necessary to be able to
cover their expenses should they unexpectedly lose their jobs.178 They
will also likely want assurance of a positive reference if they might be
forced to seek another job.179
Additionally, proving retaliation can be very difficult.180 There is
usually no definitive proof that the action of the employer was taken as a
result of a worker complaint.181 Most employment is “at will,” and thus,
employers can fire workers for any non-discriminatory reason.182 Of the
laws that include anti-retaliation provisions, only a minority (22%) seek
to address this problem of proof by either shifting the burden to the
employer of proving a non-retaliatory motive or by simply prohibiting
termination within a certain period of time absent good cause.
In particular, the strategy of prohibiting retaliation fails to provide
undocumented workers with a meaningful remedy against employer
retaliation and puts them at risk of further and potentially irrevocable
harm, including detention and deportation. Undocumented workers are
generally entitled to the protections of the anti-wage theft laws.183
175. Email from Patricia Kakalec, Att’y, Kakalec Law (Dec. 13, 2018, 13:35 CST) (on file with
authors).
176. SAN DIEGO STATE, supra note 68, at 9.
177. See, e.g., id.; CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 26.
178. Hallett, supra note 9, at 104.
179. Ruan, supra note 159, at 1120 (stating that many workers will not bring legal actions against
their employer out of fear that they will be blacklisted or unable to obtain a positive job reference).
180. CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 25–26.
181. Id. at 23; see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 420 (2004) (describing the
difficulty of an after-the-fact enforcement mechanism to address the more complex and subtle
discriminatory practices in the workplace) [hereinafter Lobel, The Renew Deal].
182. Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1511, 1518–24 (2016).
183. See, e.g., Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that
undocumented workers could collect unpaid or underpaid wages under the FLSA); Patel v. Quality
Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 705–06 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that undocumented workers are entitled to
wages for work performed under the FLSA). However, undocumented workers are not necessarily
entitled to all available remedies if they experience retaliation, including reinstatement or back pay
for the period when they were unemployed. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S.
137, 148–50 (2002); Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. Civ.A. 01-1241-JTM, 2003 WL
22519678, at *7 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003); Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d
1317, 1336–37 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
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Complaining workers who lack status may be detained and deported.184
Courts have even recognized that reporting undocumented workers to
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a form of illegal
retaliation.185 However, those same courts, when adjudicating wage
claims, are largely powerless to protect workers if they are detained and
deported.186 In an era of high-profile workplace immigration
enforcement actions,187 therefore, undocumented workers and their
concerned co-workers may be more reluctant than ever to come forward
with claims of wage theft.
Further, it is questionable whether prohibiting retaliation on-thebooks will actually encourage employers to stop retaliating. In the
context of anti-retaliation protections for whistleblowers, the empirical
evidence demonstrates that, despite the statutory protections available,
there is “continuing retaliation against whistleblowers.”188 Once it
occurs, retaliation frequently impacts not only the individual worker, but
the entire workplace.189 In the context of low-wage workers, employers
engage in rampant retaliation.190 As discussed more fully in the
following Section, there are multiple reasons why employers do not
184. REBECCA SMITH & EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKERS’
RIGHTS ON ICE: HOW IMMIGRATION REFORM CAN STOP RETALIATION AND ADVANCE LABOR
RIGHTS 4 (2013), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Workers-Rights-on-ICERetaliation-Report-California.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3LU-BE8T].
185. See Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004); Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R’s
Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile
Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1071–73 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987);
Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1058–59 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
186. Courts may be in a position to provide certification for certain kinds of victim visas but only
under circumstances where the actions rise to the level of criminal activity. See, e.g., Garcia v.
Audobon Comtys. Mgmt., LLC, No. 08-cv-01291, slip op. at 7 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 2008) (granting U
visa certifications to undocumented plaintiffs based on their status as victims of criminal
exploitation).
187. See Andrew Selsky, Activist: Immigration Officers Detain 10 Workers in Oregon,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Feb.
28,
2017),
https://apnews.com/88fd12ab02124e17968a8068bc85a3dd/Activist:-Immigration-officers-detain10-workers-in-Oregon [https://perma.cc/9XWM-D4SR]; Michael Matza, After ICE Raid at Chesco
Mushroom Farm, Anxiety High Among Immigrant Workers, INQUIRER (May 7, 2017),
https://www.philly.com/philly/news/ice-raid-mushroom-fear-deport-chester-county.html
[https://perma.cc/6A5H-AAT4]; John Burnett & Marisa Peñaloza, How Kitchen Raids in Buffalo
Sent Shock Waves Through Immigrant Rights Community, NPR (Jan. 8, 2017, 8:35 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2017/01/08/508548698/how-kitchen-raids-in-buffalo-sent-shock-wavesthrough-immigrant-rights-community [https://perma.cc/E7MR-88CU].
188. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate
Governance Provisions of Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 1, 16–17 (2007).
189. See CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 15.
190. See id. at 13; BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, supra note 38, at 3.
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obey the law that applies equally to this context of anti-retaliation
strategies.191
Finally, this strategy fails to address what has been referred to as
“anticipatory retaliation”—an employer’s ability to engage in retaliatory
acts made in anticipation of future employee action.192 For example, an
employer who wants to discourage underpaid workers from filing a
lawsuit might tell them that he fired the last worker who tried to take her
to court. Alternatively, in response to rumors about workers frustrated by
wage theft occurring at their workplace, an employer might
preemptively cut the hours of those workers he thinks are most likely to
take legal action. This form of employer control appears to be highly
effective at deterring workers, particularly low-wage workers, from
enforcing their rights.193 Despite that, the anti-retaliation prohibitions
generally fail to directly address anticipatory retaliation. Rather, they
purport to protect an employee from retaliation once the worker has
already taken certain steps to enforce their wage-related rights.194
While the strategy of prohibiting retaliation has challenges, it does
offer the possibility of concrete relief for those workers who do come
forward. In addition to the innovations of a burden-shifting regime, there
are several other innovations that seek to broaden the scope of their
protections. A small number of laws expand what is traditionally
considered protected activity to include, for example, educating others
about their wage-related rights and making informal complaints to the
employer.195 Some laws further expand the scope of coverage by
protecting those who help others to enforce their rights and prohibiting
retaliatory conduct by anyone, not just the employer.196
Only a minority of the anti-retaliation strategies (24%) permit
workers to file confidential complaints to encourage workers to come

191. See Tippett, supra note 188, at 19–20 (noting that even if top management follows the law,
supervisory personnel or coworkers may engage in retaliation); infra Section III.C.
192. Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, Threats, and The Silencing of the Brown
Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779, 780–81 (2013).
193. Id. at 781, 785.
194. See, e.g., LAS MILIPITAS, CAL., CODE § III-31-8.00 (2019) (prohibiting retaliation for
exercising rights under the law, including filing a complaint, informing others about their rights, or
helping them to assert those rights).
195. See, e.g., id. (protecting both those who file complaints and those who inform workers of
their rights); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-364(B) (2019) (protecting those who complain, inform
others of their rights, or assist others to file a complaint).
196. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 40.440 (2019) (prohibiting retaliation by “an
employer or any other person”).
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forward. Workers have expressed strong interest in this innovation.197 A
number of the confidentiality provisions, however, have limitations—
some provide for the eventual disclosure of worker information in the
later stages of the complaint process,198 while others only permit
disclosure with the worker’s advance consent.199 Even if agencies have
no intention of disclosing the name of complainants, workers may still
fear having such complaints traced back to them.200 For example,
workers in small workplaces or unique circumstances may be readily
identified by the employer regardless of whether confidential complaints
are permitted. Whether confidentiality provisions actually encourage
worker action and deter retaliation are subjects for future research.
C.

Enforcing Penalties

More than three-quarters of the anti-wage theft laws involve the
strategy of penalties. Such penalties include civil penalties (to the wage
theft victim or the government), criminal prosecution, business or other
license revocation, filing of liens or levies, negative publicity, and the
requirement of bonds.201 Penalties are problematic because they rely on
command and control strategies that are often ineffective at changing the
behavior of the regulated entities.202 Without a sufficient threat of real
enforcement that will cost the employer, penalties will fail to create real
deterrence.203 Rigidly setting one-size-fits-all standards backed up by
penalties can also fail to take into account how employers’ conduct can
deviate from the ways in which economic models expect the rational
actor to behave.204 These concepts lead us to question whether the
197. CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 35 (finding that 79% of workers
surveyed wanted an anonymous way to report workplace problems to the government).
198. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-220(c) (2019) (“The name of any employee identified in a
claim shall be kept confidential until the director issues an administrative complaint or the director
is ordered to release the information by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
199. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-364(C) (2019) (“The name of any employee
identified in a complaint to the commission shall be kept confidential as long as possible. Where the
commission determines that an employee’s name must be disclosed in order to investigate a
complaint further, it may so do only with the employee’s consent.”).
200. KEVIN BANKS, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS COMPLAINT RESOLUTION, COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON ACCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS 35 (2016).
201. See supra Section II.B.3.
202. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 305 (1999); Solomon, supra note 12, at 822;
Waterstone, supra note 138, at 487–88.
203. Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory, supra note 12, at 1097–98.
204. Employers may be influenced by something other than the rational calculus of the risks of
law breaking versus the likelihood of punishment. Norms, for example, influence regulated parties.
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strategy of enhancing penalties on the books will prove successful in
obtaining compliance from employers, thereby reducing wage theft.
Increasing penalties may do little to impact employer behavior in the
absence of robust enforcement. In a study of the minimum wage law,
Orley Ashenfelter and Daniel Smith argued that the rational employer
would assess the benefits and costs of complying with the law based on
the likelihood of an investigation together with the costs of penalties.205
Studies in other contexts, however, suggest that the probability of
detection plays an even greater role in deterring law-breaking than the
severity of punishment.206 For example, in the criminal context, solely
enhancing sanctions does not result in more successfully deterring
crime.207 “Deterrence falls off rapidly (and nonlinearly) with lower
probabilities of enforcement, and higher penalties are insufficient to
counteract these losses.”208 A lack of consistent enforcement may alter
the social norms associated with illegal activity, such as wage theft,
where individuals decide to take a chance at evading detection and
paying sub-minimum wages.209 This lack of consistent and rigorous
enforcement may also build the image of a failed agency, which
undercuts its reputation and credibility to act effectively against errant
operators.210 While one study found some correlation between increasing
penalties and decreasing minimum wage violations, it acknowledged
that it did not take into account the corresponding role of other kinds of
enforcement that would also address wage and hour violations.211 Other

Farber, supra note 202, at 320. See generally Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 181, at 448
(“Drawing on psychological analysis, behavioral law and economics has introduced the
understanding that individual preferences are endogenous, a function of experience and existing
collective norms.”).
205. See Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law, 87 J.
POL. ECON. 333, 335–36 (1979).
206. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 380
(1997).
207. Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the
Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 189 (2003).
208. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 655, 660 (2006) (footnotes omitted); see also Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, Does
Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 183–
84 (2004).
209. Cheng, supra note 208, at 661; Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227,
2237–38 (2013).
210. BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 71.
211. Galvin, supra note 9, at 341 (concluding that given one state’s increased penalties failing to
lead to a decrease in minimum wage violations means that “treble damages are not, by themselves,
sufficient to deter noncompliance with minimum wage laws; enforcement of the policy is critical as
well”).
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studies of workplace laws have found that inspections and the actual
imposition of penalties are correlated with changing employer
behavior.212
One reason for inadequate enforcement of anti-wage theft strategies is
simply insufficient agency resources. In the context of workplace
enforcement, most agencies lack adequate staff.213 A few laws attempt to
address this issue by having wage theft violators pay for the costs of
enforcement or creating a self-funding mechanism through the collection
of penalties.214 Enforcement can take a lot of resources, for example,
because employers can be hard to locate or non-responsive, particularly
with fly-by-night and undercapitalized operations. Agencies may
prematurely dismiss unpaid workers’ complaints or fail to conduct
adequate investigations because they cannot follow-up with employers
or do the in-depth investigations needed.215 Further, understaffed
agencies often solely rely on worker complaints to trigger
enforcement.216 As described in the worker complaints section, there are
many reasons why such complaints are insufficient as the primary
mechanism for driving enforcement. Jurisdictions, therefore, that rely
either exclusively or heavily on worker complaints to trigger agency
action will likely not see the robust enforcement needed to prevent
employers from violating the law.
Further, an agency’s lack of expertise or will to impose penalties may
also cause inadequate enforcement. Certain agencies may tend to
identify with employers because of agency capture or fail to have the
expertise to enforce the anti-wage theft laws because they are not
normally in the business of protecting workers.217 In particular, some
212. See, e.g., SYS. RESEARCH & APPLICATIONS CORP., REDUCING RECIDIVISM: EVALUATION OF
GOALS, MEASURES, AND COMPLIANCE TOOLS, AND OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 7 (2008) (finding
imposition of civil monetary penalties by DOL in prior investigations is associated with reduced
probability of noncompliance); Wayne B. Gray & John M. Mendeloff, The Declining Effects of
OSHA Inspections on Manufacturing Injuries, 1979–1998, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 571, 586
(2005) (hypothesizing that no penalties imposed after an OSHA inspection provided a “clean bill of
health,” which reduced attention by managers to safety issues).
213. See MEYER & GREENLEAF, supra note 163, at 19–23; Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law
of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 330 (2005) [hereinafter
Estlund, Rebuilding]; Lurie, supra note 107, at 431–33.
214. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 40.410(b)(3) (2019) (providing for fines to include
reimbursement to the agency for all appropriate costs expended in enforcing the law).
215. Levine, supra note 26.
216. MEYER & GREENLEAF, supra note 163, at 26.
217. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89
TEX. L. REV. 15, 22–23 (2010). Certain laws vest the authority to regulate in agencies that do not
normally address workers. The Philadelphia Ordinance, for example, provides the authority to
revoke or deny licenses to the Department of Licenses and Inspections (L&I). PHILA., PA., CODE
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enhanced penalties involve enforcement by non-labor related agencies,
such as police departments, district attorneys, and licensing divisions.218
Despite the availability of criminal prosecution, for example, criminal
penalties are rarely imposed because some local police or district
attorneys may not view combatting wage theft as part of their job or may
be reluctant to impose criminal charges against businesses.219 Where
prosecutors are elected rather than appointed, they, too, may be reluctant
to prosecute local businesses—particularly popular or influential ones—
fearing that such action will harm their chances of reelection.220
In addition, the imposition of monetary penalties or liens may be
compromised by the failure of agency officials or judges to investigate
thoroughly, understand the facts, or use their authority to impose
penalties. The mechanics of how wage theft occurs can raise complex
factual questions, such as issues related to deductions, overtime, and tip
pooling.221 If employer records are insufficient, these complex factual
questions can take time to sort out and create barriers to completing an
investigation. Agencies and courts also may not be aggressive in their
use of penalties against employers and exercise discretion, as permitted
by most laws, to waive or reduce the imposition of such penalties.222 In
Arkansas, for example, the agency responsible for enforcing the state
wage laws has had a policy of only imposing liquidated damages where
the employer is a repeat violator—a requirement not included in the
§ 9-4308 (2019). This department lacks expertise about worker issues. Barkow, supra, at 19–20
(discussing how agency independence requires expertise).
218. Several jurisdictions have licensing revocation systems that do not provide for either a
complaint or investigation mechanism. See, e.g., SOMERVILLE, MASS., CODE § 9-31 (2019) (lacking
mechanism for filing complaints against particular employers); NEWARK, N.J., CODE §§ 8:32-2 to
8:32-5 (2019) (omitting any information about a process for complaints about or investigation of
employers). In the same vein, a few laws that criminalize wage theft do not specify any mechanism
for how prosecutors will learn about wage theft.
219. Hallett, supra note 9, at 135. But see Effective Strategies and Tools for Wage Enforcement,
supra note 163 (discussing a few local jurisdictions that have robustly used criminal prosecution).
California, in particular, has a different system where they have a separate Criminal Investigation
Unit—with sworn police officers—within the Bureau of Field Enforcement. JULIE A. SU, DEP’T OF
INDUS. RELATIONS, 2015–2016 FISCAL YEAR REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BUREAU OF
FIELD ENFORCEMENT 10–11 (2016).
220. Immigrant workers too may fear going to a police department given the connection in some
jurisdictions between local law enforcement and ICE. See, e.g., Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft
in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 657–58 (2014) (discussing how immigrant
communities may fear local law enforcement because of potential cooperation with federal
immigration enforcement programs).
221. See supra note 145.
222. See Hallett, supra note 9, at 134; infra note 297; cf. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note
4, at 19 (suggesting that the imposition of treble damages should be mandatory to avoid leaving
discretion to the court or administrative agency about awarding damages).
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law.223 Like prosecutors, agency officials may fear the negative political
consequences, such as cuts in future agency funding from enforcing the
law too vigorously against businesses.224 At the end of the day,
therefore, agencies and courts may simply refuse to impose penalties.
For penalties to create deterrence, employers must understand when
their behavior is illegal.225 Some employers may not be aware that they
are out of compliance. An employer may be understandably confused
given the complexity of the law.226 While ignorance of the law is never
an excuse, the reality is that large employers with human resources
departments and access to legal counsel may readily understand how to
act legally while less sophisticated employers may not. Further, the
under-enforcement of laws creates “vagueness in practice,” because
without concrete examples of enforcement against regulated entities,
some employers may become confused about what, in fact, is an illegal
activity.227
Finally, employers may not act rationally in response to penalty
strategies because they may be more strongly influenced by social
norms. Multiple scholars have argued that the economic model of the
rational choice actor does not capture how individuals may make
irrational decisions.228 Even with some level of enforcement, individuals
may engage in illegal activity based on heuristics that underestimate
their chances of getting caught.229 Individuals and corporations are
known to violate the law based on the “signal of noncompliant behavior
by peers [which] is often taken as a cheap source of information (to put
it charitably, a sort of vetting) about the degree of a law’s
enforcement.”230 As certain industries predicate their business models on
wage theft, therefore, an employer may intentionally or negligently

223. Ruan, supra note 159, at 1111 (providing that because the FLSA only allows for liquidated
damages and no punitive damages, non-compliance is encouraged, as it is cheaper than the
“expected costs of the mandated wage” (footnote omitted)).
224. See Talbot, supra note 154 (stating that bureaucrats, including those involved in wage and
hour enforcement, are impacted by the potential for negative political consequences).
225. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 208, at 175–76.
226. See supra note 145.
227. Cheng, supra note 208, at 660.
228. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–77 (1988) (describing three different types of
“bounds” on human behavior that “draw into question the central ideas of utility maximization,
stable preferences, rational expectations, and optimal processing of information”); Kahan, supra
note 206, at 350 (discussing how social influences can impact behavior of an individual in deciding
whether to commit a crime).
229. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 228, at 1477–78.
230. Huang, supra note 209, at 2231.
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violate the law because it is the norm within the industry.231 Such norms
can take precedence over what the law actually requires and shape
employers’ decisions about wages and working conditions.232
Non-civil penalties, such as criminal prosecution, license revocation,
or posting of bonds, are roughly half of the available strategies for
imposing penalties against employers.233 They do, however, present a
way to up the ante against non-compliant employers by creating harsher
consequences for wage theft. As discussed in the next Part, the effective
use of penalty strategies will require agencies to depart from the rigid
command and control model to a more flexible approach that considers
the diversity of employers.
D.

Liability for Multiple Employers

A small minority (19%) of the anti-wage theft laws uses the strategy
of expanded liability. These strategies are designed to hold more than a
single employer accountable for wage theft in order to address the
fissured workplace or the disappearing or undercapitalized employer.234
The more common strategy involves creating direct liability for multiple
employers.235 Other strategies involve having the law more generally
recognize “joint and several liability” among employers or authorizing
the imposition of liability against successor entities.236
These strategies are problematic to the extent that they rely on rightsclaiming strategies for correctly “blaming” the right employers. Given
the fissured workplace, a worker’s ability to correctly blame their
multiple employers can no longer be taken for granted.237
For expanded liability strategies to be successful, agency personnel
would need the motivation, resources, or expertise to independently

231. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-925, LABOR’S EFFORTS TO ENFORCE
PROTECTIONS FOR DAY LABORERS COULD BENEFIT FROM BETTER DATA AND GUIDANCE 14–15
(2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02925.pdf [https://perma.cc/G95U-6M9B] (explaining that
the day laborer workforce is prone to workplace abuses such as wage theft); VALENZUELA JR. ET
AL., supra note 47, at 22 (explaining that the day labor market is rife with workplace violations,
including a high incidence of wage theft); Ruan, supra note 159, at 1110 (explaining that wage theft
is rampant in low-wage, frontline industries).
232. Bernhardt et al., An Introduction to the “Gloves-off Economy”, in THE GLOVES-OFF
ECONOMY, supra note 53, at 2.
233. See supra Section II.B.3.
234. See supra Section II.B.4.
235. See supra text accompanying note 120.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 121–122.
237. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
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investigate what other individuals or entities could be held liable.238
While it is often easiest to find liability against the low-level contractor
who most obviously employs the worker, holding the larger employer
accountable can have a greater impact because those entities, “located at
higher levels of industry structures,” often drive noncompliance and
have the ability to curb it.239 Without such specific support of an
advocate or agency personnel, however, an expanded liability strategy
that relies solely on workers to “blame” their multiple employers will
ultimately fail in holding multiple or larger employers higher up the
supply chain accountable for wage theft.240
Further, agencies or courts can have difficulty applying the complex
legal tests to hold employers higher up the chain liable. Less than one
third of the expanded liability strategies envision that agencies and
courts can hold multiple employers liable for wage theft by simply
authorizing joint and several liability. As a practical matter, the agency
or court will have to correctly apply a highly politicized and confusing
legal doctrine of “joint employment” to hold multiple employers liable
for wage theft. The doctrine focuses on an “economic reality” test,
which examines the relationship between the worker and putative
employer but has “detoured into a quagmire of factors.”241 Courts
considering the issue have sometimes disagreed about the essential
approach.242 In 2017, DOL changed its previous interpretation with the
change in administration by withdrawing its earlier 2016 guidance.243
Franchisors, seeking to avoid the legal obligations of being an employer,
are lobbying state legislatures to enact laws to shield themselves from
joint employment liability with their franchisees.244 The current
landscape, therefore, makes it a struggle to navigate the changing

238. An advocate or attorney could be helpful in this regard, but many workers fail to find such
help. See supra text accompanying note 65.
239. Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces, supra note 77, at 44; see also
Perez, supra note 149, at 303.
240. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text.
241. Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop:
Rediscovering the Statutory Standard of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1055 (1999).
242. Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 770 n.9 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing the confused
state of FLSA joint employment case law).
243. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Secretary of Labor Withdraws Joint Employment,
Independent Contractor Informal Guidance (June 7, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/
opa/opa20170607 [https://perma.cc/Z7EW-27MR].
244. Marni von Wilpert, States with Joint-Employer Shield Laws Are Protecting Wealthy Corporate
Franchisers at the Expense of Franchisees and Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.epi.org/publication/states-with-joint-employer-shield-laws-are-protecting-wealthycorporate-franchisers-at-the-expense-of-franchisees-and-workers/ [https://perma.cc/6GWJ-M58D].
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regulatory, judicial, and legislative definitions of joint employment
liability.245 As any strategy for expanding liability must be implemented
and enforced by the agencies and courts, the question becomes whether
they can effectively do so in order to hold multiple employers
responsible. Although courts are normally in the business of interpreting
law, it is less clear whether agency officials, who are more often tasked
with determining the question of joint employment, will have the legal
competency—or the will—to apply the law correctly.246
At the same time, confusion about the joint employment doctrine
makes it difficult for employers to understand whether their behavior is
illegal. As discussed in the enhanced penalties section, deterrence
requires that employers understand how to comply with the law.247 Yet,
strategies that generally expand liability by recognizing joint and several
liability do not provide clear guidance on who exactly is liable.248 Under
the confusion of the joint employment doctrine, it is easy for employers
to incorrectly believe that the law does not apply to them.
In contrast, expanded liability strategies that create direct or successor
liability circumvent some of these problems by explicitly defining who
is an employer. In Oregon, for example, the direct liability strategy is
more clear about which individuals or entities will be held liable for
wages: “[a]ny person who knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed
labor contractor.”249 Previous studies have shown that when employers
higher up the supply chain are clearly held accountable, they can help
monitor wage theft that is occurring further down the subcontracting
chain.250 Successor liability strategies also explicitly define employers to
245. Nina K. Markey, Continuing Uncertainty for Employers Seeking to Navigate Joint
Employment
Liability, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER
(Nov.
14,
2017,
12:45
PM),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/sites/thelegalintelligencer/2017/11/14/continuinguncertainty-for-employers-seeking-to-navigate-joint-employmentliability/?slreturn=20180205093005 [https://perma.cc/W45U-SBFR].
246. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1110 (2015); see also Scott Burris
et al., Law in Public Health Systems and Services Research, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW RESEARCH:
THEORY AND METHODS 80 (Alexander C. Wagenaar & Scott Burris eds., 2013) (citing literature
noting the importance of public health regulators to exhibit competency in the use of legal authority
and appreciation of its boundaries).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 225–226.
248. Most laws do not state anything beyond providing authority for joint and several liability.
See, e.g., MIAMI-DADE, FLA., CODE § 22-5(3) (2019) (stating that an order may specify two or more
employers as jointly and severally liable); PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-4306 (2019) (authorizing that
respondents may be held as jointly and severally liable for any amount payable to the complainant).
249. OR. REV. STAT. § 658.465(1) (2019).
250. Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy, supra note 9, at 141–43
(recounting the success of the DOL program to get garment producers to monitor down the
subcontracting chain within the industry).
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include successor entities or corporate officials to address the case of the
undercapitalized or disappearing employers.251 Jurisdictions, therefore,
that explicitly define liability have a higher likelihood of success
because they more clearly signal to employers when they will be held
liable as joint employers.
E.

Informing Workers and Employers

Half of the anti-wage theft laws reviewed include information
requirements—a broad set of mandates that require employers,
government actors, and sometimes both, to provide, collect, or share
information with either their workers or the public.
Of the information requirements, nearly half involve the strategy of
information disclosures.252 Nineteen percent require postings by the
employer regarding wage-related rights while roughly a quarter require
employers to mandatorily disclose wage-related rights or other relevant
information, such as the employer’s name, address, and phone number
or the workers’ pay rate, usually at the time of hiring.253 The idea behind
this strategy is that it can protect the recipients of the information to
make better and more informed choices, while making those who
disclose behave more honestly and diligently.254 As this regulation has
become increasingly common, scholars have critiqued the ability of
disclosure schemes to accomplish these regulatory goals.255 These
scholars question whether such disclosures are effective because
disclosures rely on a belief that individuals are rational, self-governing
actors who are able to process and use the information wisely.256
In particular, information disclosures cannot be effective if workers
do not understand the information provided. The way in which
information is provided may be equally or more important than

251. See supra text accompanying note 121.
252. See supra Section II.B.5.
253. See supra paragraph accompanying note 123.
254. Ripken, supra note 13, at 145–46 (“The disclosure of material information is said to do
everything from producing more transparent and efficient markets, to making corporate executives
behave more honestly and diligently, to decreasing investor risks and protecting the public interest.”).
255. Dalley, supra note 13, at 1090–91; Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 181, at 454–55; Troy
A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 435–36 (2003); Ripken, supra note 13, at 146. But see Cynthia
Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 355 (2011)
(“Mandatory disclosure can play a useful role both within the wide domain of private ordering and
among the many aspects of employment that are subject to mandatory rights or minimum terms.”)
[hereinafter Estlund, Just the Facts].
256. Ripken, supra note 13, at 146.
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providing the information itself.257 Given that some workers may have
issues with literacy, information provided to workers should properly
reflect their literacy and education levels to maximize its
effectiveness.258 Further, studies show that individuals tend to be more
readily persuaded by oral rather than written communications.259 All
anti-wage theft information disclosure strategies, however, involve
providing written information to workers. Workers may not understand
passively-provided written information, particularly as it applies to an
individual worker’s situation. A poster stating what minimum and
overtime wages are, for example, may not help a worker understand
whether her being classified as an employee exempt from overtime is
proper. Understanding whether wage theft is happening requires a more
interactive and personalized analysis.260 Finally, too much information
can be a problem.261 At the time of hiring, workers are often required to
fill out and read numerous documents, so mandatory disclosures can
become easily lost within a pile of paperwork.262 Studies, too, have
shown that a worker’s understanding may be more shaped by norms,
even in the face of more accurate information.263 Information disclosures
strategies, therefore, run the risk that workers will simply fail to
understand the information provided.
Even when equipped with accurate information, workers may not act
to address wage theft. Once workers have processed the new
information, “they must decide whether and how to change their
behavior based on that information.”264 Workers may not make the
expected “rational” choices based on accurate information, such as
negotiating or challenging employers who have violated the law or filing
a complaint with a governmental agency.265 As discussed elsewhere,
257. Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 228, at 1534; Weil et al., supra note 13, at 161.
258. Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing, supra note 10, at 531. Some jurisdictions seek
to address the concern of limited English proficient (LEP) workers and require employers to post or
provide information in a variety of languages. See supra text accompanying note 125.
259. Dalley, supra note 13, at 1114.
260. See supra note 145 (providing an example of how a personalized analysis is required to
determine whether overtime wages are owed).
261. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 13, at 214; Paredes, supra note 255, at 435; Ripken, supra note
13, at 147.
262. See, e.g., Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 106–07 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that
employees were required by their new employer to sign documents seventy-five times during a twohour period without explanation of the documents’ contents or sufficient opportunity to read them).
263. Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal
Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 495–96 (1999).
264. Dalley, supra note 13, at 1116.
265. Paredes, supra note 255, at 436; Ripken, supra note 13, at 146; see also Weil et al., supra
note 13, at 156 (describing key factors as to whether the information will be embedded in the users’
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workers are reluctant to claim wage theft for a variety of reasons, such as
the belief that such complaints will either be ineffective or result in
retaliation.266
Information disclosures may also fail to produce employer
compliance. Employers may either fail to understand how such
information applies to their specific business or how to specifically make
their pay practices come into legal compliance. They may also have
confirmation or self-serving bias, which prevents individuals from
accepting information that contradicts their preexisting beliefs or
adversely affects their personal interests.267 Such bias provides a strong
motivation for employers to resist accepting that their particular way of
doing business is wrong.
Further, an erroneous assumption is that employers will behave more
diligently and honestly because they know their pay practices will be
“regularly exposed to the light of day.” 268 There are several reasons why
this exposure is likely insufficient to motivate employers to comply. The
exposure of employer pay practices is limited to workers and not to
governmental agencies or the broader public. Many employers correctly
believe that workers are unlikely to act on such information.269 Even
confronted with information that confirms unlawful behavior, employers
may still risk noncompliance either because there is an insufficient threat
of enforcement or because such pay practices reflect cultural norms
within the industry.
Employers, too, may simply not comply with the posting and
mandatory disclosure requirements. Indeed, a study of 239 employers’
compliance with posting requirements found no more than half of the
employers posted as required.270 Another study of restaurants in the
Chinatown District of San Francisco found that two thirds had failed to
comply with the posting requirements (many who posted had also failed
to post in a language other than English even though postings were
available in Chinese).271 Employers willing to violate the substantive
decision-making, including the information’s perceived value in achieving the users’ goals and its
compatibility with decision-making routines).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.
267. Dalley, supra note 13, at 1114; Ripken, supra note 13, at 174.
268. Ripken, supra note 13, at 152 (stating that one of the goals of disclosure rules is to induce
corporate managers to behave more diligently and honestly because they know their actions will be
regularly exposed to the light of day).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 155–157.
270. Lee Tyner et al., Labor Law Posting Compliance: The Impact of Organizational
Characteristics, 18 . L.J. 251, 257 (2008).
271. Meredith Minkler et al., Wage Theft as a Neglected Public Health Problem, An Overview and
Case Study from San Francisco’s Chinatown District, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1010, 1013 (2014).
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provisions of the law are unlikely to comply with the information
disclosure requirements.272 Further, some laws do not provide for any
consequences for employers who fail to comply with information
disclosure requirements.273 Even when laws penalize the failure to abide
by the information disclosure requirements, employers may not be
motivated to comply if the threat of penalties is not sufficiently real.
In contrast to the employer-based information disclosure strategies, a
small minority of information requirements authorize agencies
themselves to perform outreach and education to workers (10%) and
employers (4%). Some laws additionally specify that the outreach should
be conducted in cooperation with community organizations.274 As
discussed more fully in the next Part, such strategies appear to have
more potential than information disclosure strategies because agencies
can actively tailor the presentation and format of such information so
that it is more readily understood.275
Roughly a fifth (21%) of the information requirements involve the
strategy of employer recordkeeping of wage-related information.276 As
with information disclosures, the act of requiring employers to keep
payroll records does not automatically translate into an employer’s
voluntary compliance with anti-wage theft laws.277 Employers may also
fail to keep records. In the context of occupational safety and health, for
example, one study found that 90% of employers failed to comply with
the recordkeeping requirements related to workplace injuries mandated
by OSHA.278 When employers do keep records, however, it can be
useful for providing agencies or workers with the information needed to
establish a case of wage theft.279 As an employer’s failure to keep
required records can be an additional barrier to workers seeking to

272. In some instances, the failure to comply may be based on an employer not understanding the
law well enough to disclose the required information accurately. While many jurisdictions create
form posters or disclosures, employers are still required to fill out parts of some of these documents
and may not do so accurately.
273. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 2018-36, ch. 20½, § 20½-8 (2019).
274. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12R.25 (2019) (“The Office of Labor Standards
Enforcement shall establish a community-based outreach program to conduct education and
outreach to employees.”).
275. See infra text accompanying notes 303–307.
276. Federal law has long required collection of this information by covered employers.
29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2018).
277. See supra paragraph accompanying note 267.
278. Sara E. Wuellner & David K. Bonauto, Exploring the Relationship Between Employer
Recordkeeping and Underreporting in the BLS Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 57
AM. J. INDUS. MED. 1133, 1139 (2014).
279. Talbot, supra note 154.
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enforce their rights, a small minority (12%) of the information
requirements address this problem by using the strategy of burden
shifting. Under such a burden-shifting regime, if an employer has failed
to keep records, the burden shifts from the worker to the employer to
establish that they did not commit wage theft.280 The usefulness of the
strategy of employer recordkeeping, like so many other anti-wage theft
strategies, rests on the uncertain prerequisites of action by workers or
agencies seeking to establish wage theft violations.
Finally, a small minority (10%) of the information requirements
mandate varied forms of agency data collection and disclosure. Unlike
information strategies that seek to address information asymmetries
between workers and employers, these strategies look towards data
collection, evaluation, and information transparency to foster agencies
that can be more flexibly responsive to input and collaboration.281 Some
laws require the collection of data related to recorded instances of wage
theft or agency enforcement activities, which is then reported to lawmaking bodies or the public.282 A few laws require specialized subsets of
employers to provide wage reports directly to the agency.283 As
discussed in the next Part, such data collection has the potential to
improve the way in which the agency carries out its anti-wage theft
strategies.
IV. RETHINKING, RECONCEIVING, AND LOOKING BEYOND
REGULATION
Despite finding that many of the most common anti-wage theft
strategies are limited, this Article does not conclude that state and local
regulation is futile. Governments can do things that individual workers
cannot, such as declare the rule of law, provide oversight, and create
new rights and mechanisms to enforce the law. Low-wage workers have
directly led many law reform efforts through advocacy organizations,
which is significant not only to their own empowerment but also as a
280. Federal law already provides for a similar burden-shifting regime where employers fail to
comply with the recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery,
328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946).
281. See Solomon, supra note 12, at 834 (describing new governance approaches as including
public participation, data provision, transparency, benchmarking, and a sharing of best practices).
282. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12R.5, 12R.7, 12R.16–18 (2019) (providing that
agency representatives may access employers’ records and may publicly post notice of an
employer’s failure to comply).
283. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.104 (2019) (requiring business owners in the
construction industry to provide construction pay transparency reports with information about the
contractors and subcontractors).
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means to increase their political power.284 Further, individual workers
have benefitted from the anti-wage theft strategies currently in place,
including the ability to recover lost wages. State and local regulation,
therefore, still holds promise for addressing the rollback of federal
workplace protections.
Our analysis of the recent wave of anti-wage theft strategies implies
that better choices can be made about what strategies to advocate for
while agencies can consider more strategic implementation by
reconceiving of the role of government. At the same time, strategies that
look beyond governmental regulation are also valuable. For those
jurisdictions where state and local regulation becomes impossible
because of politics, nongovernmental strategies are potentially promising
because such strategies look to workers, unions, worker centers, and
community organizations rather than government to address wage theft.
A.

Promising Anti-Wage Theft Strategies

In examining the twenty-two types of anti-wage theft strategies, we
found several innovative approaches that are promising because they
avoid many of the assumptions embedded in the most common
regulatory strategies. These strategies have the potential to address some
of the problems with such failed regulatory strategies by facilitating
rights claiming, increasing the effectiveness of command and control
regulation, and tailoring information requirements to help individuals
understand and act on the information provided. While we recognize that
political realties may ultimately impact the contents of anti-wage theft
laws, we highlight these strategies as a means to focus additional
advocacy and research efforts on them.
Several anti-wage theft strategies seek to overcome the traditional
regulatory failure of rights-claiming strategies by reducing likely barriers
to “naming, blaming, and claiming.”285 These strategies expand the
definition of who can be a complainant, facilitate processes for workers
who may fear retaliation, and shift the heavy burden of proof which

284. A number of resources cover these local campaigns. See, e.g., BOBO, supra note 21, at 197
(discussing the law reform efforts led by Somos Un Pueblo Unido, a statewide membership-based
immigrant rights organization); Deborah Axt, Amy Carroll & Andrew Friedman, The Campaign to
Pass New York’s Wage Theft Prevention Act, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 154, 154 (2001)
(describing how Make the Road New York, an organization that fights for economic opportunity for
and civic participation of immigrants, led the coalition that would take the local wage theft
campaigns to the state level); THEODORE, supra note 78, at 17 (recounting how Casa Latina, a
community-based immigrant rights organization, led the charge to get the wage theft ordinance
enacted in Seattle).
285. See supra Section III.A.
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traditionally faces employees. For example, authorizing interested
community members and organizations to initiate complaints opens up
the complaint process to those who are insulated from employer
retaliation. As discussed in the next Section, agency collaboration with
community organizations can help encourage complaints that otherwise
would not be brought. Permitting anonymous complaints could make it
less risky, and thus less threatening, for workers and others to file
complaints.286
Once complaints are filed, the burden shifting required when
employers fail to maintain or provide pay-related records makes it easier
for workers to prove their unpaid wage claims.287 Knowing they need
not have records to prevail may also encourage more workers to come
forward. Employers too may find it harder to fire workers in retaliation
where the law prohibits termination without good cause within a certain
period of the worker’s protected conduct.288 The presumption of
retaliation when termination occurs close in time to protected activities
should also make it easier for workers to prove retaliation.289 All of these
strategies are potentially promising but require further study to truly
know whether they are effective in facilitating worker complaints.290
Even if they do facilitate worker complaints, there is still the ultimate
question of whether such complaints will significantly reduce wage
theft—particularly if they continue to fail to overlap with the worst and
most systemic violators.291
Further, several anti-wage theft strategies attempt to improve on the
failure of traditional command and control tactics for enforcement
because agencies lack the will, resources, or expertise to robustly
investigate and penalize employers who have acted illegally. Rather than
seek to hold employers accountable after-the-fact, a little-used strategy is
to require certain high-risk employers, such as car washes, nail salons, or
construction contractors, to provide wage bonds in conjunction with a
specialized license to operate their business.292 Such bonds require

286. While not specifically an anti-wage theft strategy, some jurisdictions have passed legislation
that prohibits blacklisting, which might prove useful in limiting wage-related retaliation. See, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.010 (2019).
287. Talbot, supra note 154.
288. CHALLENGING THE BUSINESS OF FEAR, supra note 172, at 36.
289. See id.
290. Further studies could focus on jurisdictions with such presumptions to research the extent to
which burden shifting is actually being used and, if so, whether it has a meaningful impact.
291. See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
292. BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.104.060 (2019) (construction); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 20-542 (2019) (car washes); OR. REV. STAT. § 658.419 (2019) (farm labor contractors).
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employers, who are either repeat violators or in industries with rampant
wage theft, to secure a bond as a form of insurance in case of wage
theft.293 Another strategy that seeks to prevent wage theft is requiring
employers to submit wage reports to the agency.294 Requirements to selfreport directly to the agency might encourage voluntary compliance by
some employers.295 Such data could help agencies to shortcut the
investigatory process, locate non-compliant employers, and more
flexibly respond to different kinds of employers.
Other strategies seek to reduce the amount of discretion available to
agencies that may lack the will or expertise to engage in robust
enforcement. Expanded liability strategies, for example, which more
clearly delineate the scope of liability for joint employers, arguably
make the imposition of such liability against multiple employers more
likely.296 Some enhanced penalty strategies prohibit agencies from
waiving penalties where wage theft has occurred.297 Finally, some
penalty strategies attempt to create a self-funding mechanism, where the
costs of enforcement are paid by the employer back to the agency, to
provide agencies with additional resources.298 However, “[s]everal
administrators argued against this method of financing, saying that their
goal was to obtain restitution from employers, not money for the
agency.”299
The strategy of data collection and reporting of information by
agencies has the promise of helping them overcome ossified command
and control regulatory tactics to become more flexible, responsive, and
293. Wage bonds may be prohibitively expensive for small businesses. It may be necessary to
exempt such small businesses or find other ways, such as a local or state tax credit, to assist
businesses in purchasing such wage bonds.
294. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.104.040 (2019) (requiring owner to submit a
Construction Pay Transparency Report).
295. This strategy assumes that the information provided to the agency is accurate.
296. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 218.7 (West 2019) (specifying that a construction contractor
shall be liable for any wage debt incurred by a subcontractor at any tier acting for the direct
contractor); OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415 (2019) (holding “[a]ny person who uses the services of a
labor contractor” liable for the wages of the contractor’s workers).
297. See, e.g., FLAGSTAFF, ARIZ., CODE § 15-01-001-0007(A) (2019) (requiring the payment of
liquidated damages); LOUISVILLE, KY., CODE § 112.99 (2019) (requiring payment of full amount of
wages due and civil penalty); OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 25-6(a)(2) (2019) (requiring
restitution and treble damages). On the flip side, mandatory penalties can result in less flexibility for
agencies that want to use the discretion to waive penalties as an inducement to get employers to
settle worker complaints more quickly.
298. See, e.g., ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-45(b)(2) (2019) (finding an employer in
violation required to pay “administrative costs of processing the claim and all the costs of the
hearing”). Some state agencies have had success with such funding mechanisms. See Lurie, supra
note 107, at 432.
299. See Lurie, supra note 107, at 432.
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problem-solving oriented. The reporting of data to governing bodies or
the public can increase agency accountability, if the reported data helps
to assess agency actions.300 In theory, the data can also be used to better
allocate enforcement resources and to adjust the law based on patterns or
concerns that emerge.301 Agencies themselves can use the data to engage
in self-evaluation and strategizing that will help them more effectively
tackle the issue of wage theft. Yet while such data collection and
reporting strategies are promising, the successful use of data will largely
be dependent on whether the data itself reflects useful and accurate
information, and the ability of the public, lawmakers, or agency
personnel to make good use of it.302
Finally, there may be other strategies that involve providing
information useful to the fight against wage theft instead of relying on
the failed strategy of information disclosures. For example, active forms
of communicating information, such as in-person trainings, may be more
effective than posters and written disclosures for both employers and
workers.303 Very few information strategies involve outreach and
education to either workers or employers.304 Yet such strategies offer the
potential for agencies to create programs that use an active means of
providing information, which can be more effective in helping workers
understand their rights and helping employers come into compliance.305
Further, trainings may provide concrete tools for workers and
employers, such as pre-printed cards or booklets where workers can take
relevant notes about the terms and conditions of their jobs or the hours
that they have worked or sample industry-specific policies about pay
300. See Dalley, supra note 13, at 1122–23; Solomon, supra note 12, at 823.
301. Making better use of data already collected by state agencies, such as data regarding
unemployment or workers’ compensation, might prove useful. Information sharing between agencies
could help agencies better identify targets for investigation and enforcement of wage laws. See ANDREW
ELMORE & MUZAFFAR CHISTI, MIGRATION POLICY INST., STRATEGIC LEVERAGE: USE OF STATE AND
LOCAL LAWS TO ENFORCE STANDARDS IN IMMIGRANT-DENSE OCCUPATIONS 30–33 (2018).
302. An open question is whether the actual data that is being collected, such as the number of
complaints filed, the amount of wages recovered, and the budgetary costs expended on the program
is ultimately the kind of data that helps to create agency accountability. See Jennifer Shkabatur,
Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 80, 118 (2012) (discussing how online transparency rules for agencies fail to result in
the disclosure of useful information for the public). Political conditions can also prevent
accountability even if there is good data disclosure. Tiago Pexioto, The Uncertain Relationship
Between Open Data and Accountability: A Response to Yu and Robinson’s the New Ambiguity of
Open Government, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 200, 213 (2013).
303. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
304. Only thirteen states and localities have employed information strategies involving outreach
and education.
305. BOBO, supra note 21, at 108–09.
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practices.306 As explained more fully below, information strategies are
likely to be more successful if they involve cooperation with employer
networks or community organizations that can help tailor such
educational strategies to be more accessible, useful, and culturally
appropriate to their audiences.307
B.

Rethinking Agency Approaches

Rethinking the ways in which agencies traditionally approach antiwage theft strategies has the potential to make them more effective by
reconceiving the role of government and how it might cooperate with
workers, communities, and regulated entities. Scholars who have
explored “new governance” theory argue that government should enter
into non-traditional and potentially collaborative arrangements with
workers, worker advocates, or employers to improve regulatory
outcomes.308 These more flexible approaches are intended to help
confront the failures of the traditional command and control regime,
including the lack of agency staff and resources309 and any limitations
regarding the motivation, competency, and bias of agency staff and
leadership.310 They also seek to address the failures of traditional rights
claiming and information strategies. This Section briefly reviews why
such approaches are more likely to be productive while recognizing
some reservations about successfully executing them.
1.

Differentiating Employers

There are vast differences between large companies with human
resources departments, mom and pop businesses inadvertently violating
the law, and some of the worst fly-by-night operations and repeat
offenders who deliberately build their business model around wage theft.
306. See, e.g., Liz Robbins, New Weapon in Day Laborers’ Fight Against Wage Theft: A
Smartphone App, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/nyregion/newweapon-in-day-laborers-fight-against-wage-theft-a-smartphone-app.html [https://perma.cc/Q4GYM754] (discussing the creation of a new app that allows day laborers to record such information).
307. See supra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
308. These collaborative arrangements are alternatively called co-governance, tripartism, or
collaborative governance. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 5 (1992); Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative
Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 543, 544–45 (2007);
Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, supra note 213, at 362–65; Fine & Gordon, supra
note 8, at 559–60; Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory, supra note 12, at 1141.
309. See supra notes 56–57.
310. Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy, supra note 9, at 133
(recognizing that agencies get into “ruts” in carrying out enforcement).
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Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite recognized the need for enforcement
systems to be responsive to the diversity of the entities they are trying to
regulate.311 They suggested an enforcement system that resembles a
pyramid, where the bottom would include more cooperative regulatory
measures and the top would involve very real and harsh penalties.312 The
rationale for the pyramid enforcement system is that persuasion is cheap
and punishment is expensive.313 Given the diversity of employers, less
resource-intensive cooperative mechanisms might be more appropriate
for certain kinds of employers while meaningful penalties might be
necessary for others.314 The anti-wage theft laws we examined, with the
exception of a handful of laws focused on the day labor, construction,
and temporary staffing industries, tend to treat all employers
uniformly.315 While the absence of differential treatment does not
necessarily mean that agencies cannot do so upon implementation, it
suggests that the default will be a one-size-fits-all use of anti-wage theft
strategies.
Large companies, for example, often care about their reputation, so
the threat of negative publicity may effectively deter wage theft.316
Agencies might cooperatively engage with larger companies to find
ways to have them self-enforce the downstream subcontractors of
franchisees that comprise their business. David Weil has extensively
studied the concept of how to hold “‘lead firms’ (i.e., firms at the top of
the industry structure)” accountable in order to address some of the
problems associated with the fissured workplace.317 He proposes a
cooperative agreement between governmental agencies and top brands,
focused on specific industries that “could include a commitment by the
brand to cascade information through its company-owned properties and
outlets, and to its franchisees, as well as a commitment to review
employment practices with franchisees when other franchise standards
are being reviewed.”318

311. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 308, at 38–39.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 26–27.
315. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-15-1 (West 2019) (focusing on day laborers); OR. REV.
STAT. § 658.405 (2019) (focusing on construction contractors).
316. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 308, at 22; Weil, Enforcing Workplace Standards in
Fissured Workplaces, supra note 77, at 46–47.
317. See Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces, supra note 77, at 33; WEIL,
IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 73, at 79.
318. WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 73, at 78.
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In fact, David Weil cites as a successful example DOL’s cooperative
agreements in the 1990s with manufacturers in the garment industry that
entered into monitoring arrangements with its subcontractors.319 With
those cooperative agreements, DOL used the harsh threat of the “hot
goods” provision, which involves preventing the shipment of goods
produced in violation of the wage and hour laws, to induce such
cooperation.320 Other threats might include holding employers at the top
responsible for enhanced penalties through various joint employment
theories. In particular, those anti-wage theft strategies that expand
employer liability more directly—which we found in only a minority of
anti-wage theft laws—become a much more significant tool for inducing
compliance.321
Some employers may simply need more assistance to get into
compliance.322 For example, unsophisticated employers who lack legal
counsel could benefit from training on how to properly calculate wages
or access to templates for required recordkeeping. We were generally
unable, however, to find many reported examples of robust cooperation
between employer groups and state and local agencies with the aim of
improving compliance, although there were a few jurisdictions that
mandated outreach or education to employers.323 Yet employer
networks—often specific to certain industries—can have a great impact
on employer behavior to the extent that employers participate in such
networks.324 Agencies can cooperate with such employer networks to
engage in active forms of education and develop industry-specific model
policies.
Those employers whose business model is built on wage theft may
not care about negative publicity or complying with the law, as long as
319. David Weil, Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New Approach to
Regulating the Minimum Wage, 58 INDUS. & L. REL. REV. 238, 255 (2005).
320. Id. at 244.
321. See supra notes 249–250 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 555 (noting that small businesses are less likely to
have sophisticated human resources departments that facilitate proactive learning about the law);
Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy, supra note 9, at 138 (discussing how
sometimes employers simply need information to move towards compliance).
323. See, e.g., FLAGSTAFF, ARIZ., CODE § 15-01-001-0007(F) (2019) (establishing an education
and outreach program to both employees and employers); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE
§ 3.15.000(A) (2019) (“[p]romoting labor standards through outreach, education, technical
assistance, and training for employees and employers”).
324. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 308, at 39; WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS,
supra note 73, at 57; see also Chris Fuchs, Lawsuit Filed by Nail Salon Trade Groups Against New
York State Dismissed, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:48 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asianamerica/lawsuit-filed-nail-salon-trade-groups-against-new-york-state-n477156
[https://perma.cc/D7CQ-E7S7] (noting employer networks for the nail salon industry).
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they are able to continue violating the law with impunity. These
employers may be more likely deterred if there is a credible threat of
severe penalties, such as having their businesses shut down or facing
criminal charges. This implies that a variety of strategies beyond civil
penalties are needed. In New York, for example, after a news article
exposed rampant wage theft within the nail salon industry, Governor
Cuomo organized a task force and focused its investigation on the
industry.325 As part of its enforcement, New York focused on shutting
down operations of unlicensed businesses and revoking the licenses of
businesses that were substantially out of compliance.326 In California, the
Labor Commissioner charged an owner of a San Diego restaurant with
felony grand wage theft by false pretenses.327 It may be that these
strategies require dissemination through employer networks of
information about enforcement activity to make deterrence truly
effective.328 For employers that operate in multiple jurisdictions, it might
help to coordinate and cooperate across local agencies to pool
resources.329 Since the imposition of penalties is resource-intensive,
agencies should strategically consider targeting those industries that
have the highest number of violations and would be likely most
responsive to these kinds of strategies. As discussed in the next Section,
this approach necessarily involves proactively initiating investigations,
perhaps in consultation with worker advocacy organizations, rather than
relying solely on an enforcement model based on incoming
complaints.330

325. Frida Garza, Recovered Wages: New York’s Nail Salons Must Finally Compensate Their
Workers for Wage Theft, QUARTZ (May 9, 2016), https://qz.com/679127/new-yorks-nail-salonsmust-finally-compensate-their-workers-for-wage-theft/ [https://perma.cc/D65A-ZNJF].
326. Press Release, New York State Governor’s Office, Governor Cuomo Introduces Legislation
and Comprehensive Plan to Protect Nail Salon Workers and Educate Employers (May 18, 2015),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-introduces-legislation-and-comprehensiveplan-protect-nail-salon-workers-and [https://perma.cc/27LC-BX6S].
327. Gail Cecchettini Whaley, California Wage Theft Case Leads to Landmark Criminal
Conviction, HRWATCHDOG (Dec. 21, 2016), http://hrwatchdog.calchamber.com/2016/12/californiawage-theft-case-landmark-criminal-conviction/ [https://perma.cc/649L-YU38].
328. WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, supra note 73, at 56–57, 74 (noting that
holding independent motels accountable for wage theft will not necessarily deter other operators
within the same industry because of a lack of “glue”).
329. KOONZE ET AL., supra note 79, at 13.
330. Weil, A Strategic Approach, supra note 139, at 364.
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Community Partnerships

Many have advocated for cooperative models of agency enforcement
with worker organizations to encourage more strategic enforcement.331
Agencies that devote their enforcement resources exclusively to
responding to worker complaints may be less effective at combating
wage theft.332 In contrast, agencies can focus on strategic enforcement
efforts through community partnerships, which can provide agencies
with increased on-the-ground information about wage theft.333 Further,
such community partnerships can play a role in more effectively
disseminating legal rights information to worker populations.334
Janice Fine and Jennifer Gordon have argued that worker
organizations can play a “co-enforcement” role in enforcing workplace
standards, which would be more effective than an agency driven solely
by worker complaints.335 Several case studies reveal how the integration
of worker organizations into agencies can help focus resources on the
most common and problematic employers where workers would be most
unlikely to come forward with worker complaints.336 Since 2009, San
Francisco’s Office of Labor Standards Enforcement (OLSE) has entered
into contracts with various community groups to increase the efficacy of
San Francisco’s labor laws.337 Beyond traditional outreach to low-wage
and immigrant workers, the contracted community groups also help
make referrals, such that approximately 30% of complaints received by
OLSE come directly from them.338 In fiscal year 2013 to 2014, the office
collected more in back wages and interest from the cases filed with the
help of the groups than from those generated by worker complaints
alone.339

331. DONALD M. KERWIN & KRISTEN MCCABE, LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT AND LOWWAGE IMMIGRANTS 48 (2011); RONDÓN ICHIKAWA & SMITH, supra note 139, at 12–15;
THEODORE, supra note 78, at 8–14; Julie A. Su, Enforcing Labor Laws: Wage Theft, the Myth of
Neutrality, and Agency Transformation, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 153–54 (2016).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 168–170.
333. Janice Fine, New Approaches to Enforcing Labor Standards: How Co-Enforcement
Partnerships between Government and Civil Society Are Showing the Way Forward, 2017 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 143, 145–46 (2017) [hereinafter Fine, New Approaches].
334. Id. at 151.
335. Id. at 146.
336. Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 559–60 (2010); see also KERWIN & MCCABE, supra note
331, at 12–13; THEODORE, supra note 78, at 8–14; Su, supra note 331, at 153–54.
337. LOCAL PROGRESS & THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, CITY STRATEGIES TO COMBAT
WAGE THEFT AND EMPOWER WORKERS 4 (2014).
338. RONDÓN ICHIKAWA & SMITH, supra note 139, at 13.
339. KOONZE ET AL., supra note 79, at 13.
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In California, the Labor Commissioner has relied on “communitybased organizations who already have the trust of workers, speak the
language of workers, [and] understand how violations occur and are
often masked” to give them leads and help to bridge the trust gap
between workers and law.340 One such example includes collaborating
with the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund (MCTF), a California
janitorial nonprofit created through a labor-management partnership that
seeks to abolish unfair business practices that harm businesses and
workers in the janitorial industry.341 MCTF has assisted in bringing cases
that resulted in millions of dollars of unpaid wages for janitors.342 The
benefits of these collaborations come from the organization’s ability to
get information directly from workers and information that
governmental agencies otherwise tend not to have, including more
intimate knowledge about industry subcontracting.343 Community groups
can also play a countervailing role when there is political pressure on the
agency by employers to keep the agency from issuing real and harsh
penalties.344
Further, community groups have worked directly with agencies to
improve the worker complaint processes while better coordinating and
streamlining investigatory processes.345 The Chicago Area Workers
Rights Initiative, for example, is a partnership between the Chicago
Interfaith Workers Rights Center and federal and state agencies to
improve monitoring and enforcement.346 Among other things, this
partnership devised a uniform complaint for all agencies as a single page
form that has all the information that every agency needs, while
negotiating a system with agencies where the complaints from the
Center moved to the top of the pile.347 Worker centers can help workers
file complaints with an agency or in court by providing technical
expertise for recovering their unpaid wages through the legal system,
such as helping workers to present accurate information and complete

340. Supra note 331, at 153.
341. Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 565–66.
342. Id.; see also News Release, Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, California Labor Commissioner
Cites Two Janitorial Companies More than $1.5 Million for Multiple Wage Theft Violations (May
8, 2014), https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2014/2014-42.pdf [https://perma.cc/52HF-RPT9]
(noting that MCTF was instrumental in bringing information on a wage theft case that amounted to
more than $1.5 million in violations).
343. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 333, at 151–52.
344. Id. at 152.
345. Id. at 154.
346. FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 82.
347. Id.
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documents needed by the agency or court.348 This technical assistance
helps agencies more efficiently enforce wage laws by encouraging
workers to come forward and helping them navigate their filed
complaints.
With respect to information requirements, an agency can work with
community-based organizations to more proactively ensure that workers
understand the information provided.349 In Seattle, for example, the
Office of Labor Standards selected ten different organizations and
community partnerships to receive $1 million in funding to provide
outreach, education, and technical assistance to workers.350 It makes
sense that worker organizations will not only have better access to
workers within their communities but also that they can engage in more
interactive and culturally appropriate forms of education that are more
likely to assist workers understand their rights.351
Community partnerships with agencies can help change agency
culture. These partnerships can play a role in motivating, training, and
increasing the competency of agency staff.352 Joint efforts by community
groups and agency staff to educate workers within their communities,
for example, can not only train agency staff on the particular on-theground issues that workers face but also help motivate them by seeing
the social cost of wage theft firsthand.353 Well-publicized success by the
agency, stemming from community partnerships, can motivate agency
leadership and staff to continue to employ rigorous enforcement
methods for altering the behavior of employers.354
3.

Barriers to Change

There are three challenges to altering the ways in which agencies
traditionally approach anti-wage theft strategies. First, there is the
question of whether such arrangements should be enumerated within the
anti-wage theft law itself. There are a few anti-wage theft laws, for
example, that contain explicit cooperation requirements with respect to
348. Id.
349. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 333, at 146.
350. 2017–2019 Community Outreach and Education Fund, OFF. LAB. STANDARDS,
https://www.seattle.gov/laborstandards/outreach/community-fund/2017-2019-community-outreachand-education-fund [https://perma.cc/R4VJ-ACYS].
351. Talbot, supra note 154.
352. Email from Sarah Hymowitz, Staff Att’y, Legal Servs. of N.J. (Dec. 27, 2018, 13:17 CST)
(on file with authors).
353. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 333, at 151 (discussing how worker organizations are in
the unique position to share specialized knowledge with investigators at agencies).
354. Id.
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worker education355 or community task forces charged with filing and
investigating complaints.356 At the same time, we found instances where
such cooperation occurred informally as a result of direct advocacy by
nongovernmental organizations with agencies.357 While formalizing such
agreements can clearly delineate the respective obligations, it can also
publicize an arrangement that otherwise would politically fly “under the
radar” unopposed.358 Mandated or pre-set agreements, however, can also
fail to produce on-the-ground collaboration.359 On the other hand,
formally requiring collaboration might be less important than creating
the conditions for successful partnerships. Those who have studied
public administration describe multiple factors to make collaborative
governance successful, such as self-reinforcing interactions among
stakeholders, shared motivation, and the capacity for joint action.360
Second, the criticism of such cooperative models is that they risk
agency capture or the appearance of cooptation of the agency by
employers or workers.361 In the case of employers, the fear is that
cooperation will simply take the place of robust enforcement. In
particular, it can stand in tension with the principles of accountability
because “soft law” or voluntary compliance may simply translate into
agencies failing to hold employers accountable. The key for successfully
cooperating with employers, therefore, is not for the agency to opt for
employer cooperation in place of the traditional enforcement
approaches, but rather to maintain both approaches simultaneously.362
355. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., CODE § 12R.25 (2019) (establishing its community-based outreach
program in partnership with organizations); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-47(a) (2019) (stating
that its policy is to engage community-based organizations, including through contract, to assist
with employer and worker education).
356. See, e.g., ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-47(b) (2019) (stating that the appointed official
by the Mayor “is authorized to direct proactive investigations of designated industries or employers
in response to alleged [complaints by] employees, residents, organizations, or employers”); N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 331 (McKinney 2019) (establishing “Fair Wages Task Force” to inspect, ensure
compliance, and implement provisions of the labor law). Other laws simply broaden who is eligible
to file a complaint so that it could theoretically include community organizations. See, e.g., LOS
ALTOS, CAL., CODE § 3.50.080 (2019) (“An employee or any other person may report to the city in
writing any suspected violation of this chapter.”).
357. See FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 84; THEODORE, supra note 78, at 23.
358. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 561; Janice Fine, Solving the Problem from Hell:
Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing Labour Standards Non-Compliance in the United States, 50
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813, 840–42 (2013).
359. KIRK EMERSON & TINA NABATCHI, COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE REGIMES 174–75 (2015).
360. Kirk Emerson et al., An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance, 22 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 17 (2011).
361. Solomon, supra note 12, at 827.
362. Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, supra note 213, at 387–88; Fine & Gordon,
supra note 8, at 559, 562.
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Further, past examples of such enforced self-regulation have been more
successful when they include worker representatives to assist in
monitoring and compliance.363 In the case of workers, agencies may be
attacked for being influenced by worker organizations and generally
biased against employers.364 The participation of worker organizations
risk turning the enforcement of wage and hour laws into an even more
politicized issue. This risk, therefore, speaks to the need to consider such
flexible arrangements with both employers and worker organizations to
help negate the idea that the agency is favoring one group over the other.
Third, the challenge with such cooperative approaches is that they
simply are not realistic for many jurisdictions. The success of these
cooperative arrangements relies on a baseline of anti-wage theft
strategies as well as sustained and sufficient agency funding. Agencies
should be able to more easily leverage such arrangements with employer
networks or worker organizations if they have within their arsenal some
of the less common and innovative strategies, such as non-civil penalties
or expanded liability based on a broader definition of employer.365
Beyond the pre-existing legal framework, there needs to be the political
willingness of government to make such arrangements possible. Yet not
all geographic locations have willing agencies, robust worker
organizations, or cooperative employers that can play these roles.366
Whether such arrangements are formal or informal, they cannot occur
without “facilitative leaders” on both sides of the cooperative
agreement.367
C.

Looking Beyond Regulation

While we do not reject regulation altogether, it is worthwhile to look
beyond governmental regulation to address wage theft. In particular,
some Republican-leaning jurisdictions that have been left out of the
recent wave of anti-wage theft legislation cannot realistically rely on
regulation at all. Nongovernmental strategies that rely on worker
organizing, therefore, offer a way to address wage theft through direct
negotiations, online information sharing, and public shaming.
Workers may directly negotiate with employers through a union or
other mechanisms to ensure the proper payment of wages for their work.
363. Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, supra note 213, at 350–51; Fine & Gordon,
supra note 8, at 561.
364. See Fine & Gordon, supra note 8, at 572 (describing concern about abuse of power by unions).
365. See supra Section IV.A for a summary.
366. Fine, New Approaches, supra note 333, at 152, 174.
367. Ansell & Gash, supra note 308, at 554–55.
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Unions have stepped up their efforts to help workers who have suffered
wage theft.368 The fissured workplace, however, has made traditional
union organizing more difficult as many low-wage workers no longer
work in a centralized workplace for a single employer.369 As a result,
other types of worker organizing have flourished through worker
centers. Such centers support workers so that they can directly demand
their wages from employers.370 These centers also create opportunities
for workers to collectively negotiate set standards for wages and wage
payment.371 Centro Humanitario in Denver, for example, sets the terms
and conditions for the hiring of day laborers with employers.372 In
exchange for matching employers with workers, “employers agree to
pay each worker directly, at a minimum rate of $15/hour.”373 Employers
that fail to meet such standards can no longer participate in the
program.374 Worker centers have also helped to support the creation of
worker cooperatives, which serve as another mechanism for ensuring
that workers are able to set their own working terms and conditions.375
La Colectiva, a domestic worker collective in California, has a
guaranteed hourly wage between $11 and $17 per hour, with a three
hour minimum, for all of its members.376
When there are specific wage theft problems with employers, workers
have taken direct action to publicly shame them. Such direct actions
involve picketing, protesting, or taking other highly visible action to
highlight the issue of workplace exploitation. Workers capture the
attention of employers with lively pickets that target foot traffic, impact
commercial reputation, and garner media coverage.377 Direct actions are
especially suitable at revealing wage theft by exposing the secrecy that
typically accompanies employment relationships in low-wage

368. BOBO, supra note 21, at 95–99.
369. Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1739–40 (2018).
370. BOBO, supra note 21, at 109–10; FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 78.
371. Jayesh Rathod, Danger and Dignity: Immigrant Day Laborers and Occupational Risk, 46
SETON HALL L. REV. 813, 853–54 (2016); VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., supra note 47, at 8–9.
372. Employment Programs, CENTRO HUMANITARIO, http://www.centrohumanitario.org/
programs/employment/ [https://perma.cc/Q8ZH-6A7N].
373. Id.
374. Email from Johnathon Prather, Worker Ctr. Coordinator, Centro Humanitario (Jan. 4, 2019,
10:51 CST) (on file with authors).
375. FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 78.
376. Elizabeth J. Kennedy & Michael B. Runnels, Bringing New Governance Home: The Need
for Regulation in the Domestic Workplace, 81 UMKC L. REV. 899, 911 (2013).
377. FINE, WORKER CENTERS, supra note 65, at 82.
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industries.378 Domestic Workers United (DWU), for example, has been
at the forefront of exposing the privacy of domestic work, such as
childcare, housekeeping, or elder care, and engaged in regular gatherings
in front of employer homes in demonstrations of shame when those
employers fail to pay.379
Workers are also increasingly using online forums to share
information with other workers about their experiences with employers,
including whether they engage in wage theft. The website
contratados.org, created and maintained by the migrant rights
organization Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, shares information
about employers for temporary visa workers in the United States.380 It
allows workers to post reviews of labor recruiters and employers for
whom they have worked, which include information about whether they
were paid for all hours worked.381 Prospective employees can then
search for different employers when considering which jobs they might
take when seeking visas to come to the United States.382 A smartphone
app is under development in New York City for day laborers to rate
employers.383 Workers also use online sites like Indeed and Glassdoor to
post information about their employment experiences.384 Like consumer
reviews of businesses, these sites potentially provide workers with a
platform to publicly review their employers, which can include employer
conduct regarding wage theft.
Worker organizations have also sought to leverage consumer pressure
to publicize wage problems and address wage theft. The following
examples involve the use of consumer pressure, which goes beyond
addressing the singular issue of wage theft to the broader issue of
improving wages and working conditions for workers. The renowned
Fair Food Program by the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) has
378. THEODORE, supra note 78, at 13.
379. Eileen Boris & Premilla Nadasen, Domestic Workers Organize!, 11 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB.
& SOC’Y 413, 427 (2008).
380. Do You Have a TN Visa? Know Your Rights!, CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC.,
https://contratados.org/en/content/do-you-have-tn-visa-know-your-rights [https://perma.cc/YA4R-YTLC].
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Robbins, supra note 306.
384. See, e.g., Company Review, GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/EmployeeReview-Sitel-RVW16666659.htm [https://perma.cc/HCK7-9DVA] (hosting employee posts that
review employment experiences at a company); Sarpino’s Pizzeria Employee Reviews, INDEED,
https://www.indeed.com/cmp/Sarpino’s-Pizzeria/reviews [https://perma.cc/X5SB-BVK6] (hosting
employee reviews about working at a particular business). See generally 11 Sites Where You Can
Find Employee Reviews, FAIRYGODBOSS, https://fairygodboss.com/career-topics/employer-reviewsites-employee-reviews [https://perma.cc/8NVZ-RYPF].
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succeeded in publicly exposing how market mechanics manage to
exploit farm workers by urging consumers to pressure well-known
businesses at the top of the supply chain.385 CIW then enters into legally
binding agreements with participating buyers, ranging from McDonald’s
to Trader Joe’s, which requires them to commit to pay the “Fair Food
Premium” and to suspend purchases from agricultural employers who
have failed to abide by fair labor practices.386 The Milk with Dignity
campaign targeted Ben and Jerry’s to improve the wages and working
conditions of workers in the dairy supply chain in Vermont.387 In 2015,
after organizing actions at Ben & Jerry’s shops across the nation, an
agreement was signed that included paying a premium to workers and
providing for third party monitoring of the code of conduct, which
includes receiving worker complaints, addressing grievances, and
enforcing consequences for non-compliance.388 Restaurant Opportunities
Center United (ROC) created a consumers’ association called Diners
United that seeks to mobilize restaurant diners in support of livable
wages and working conditions.389 Further, it seeks to publicize high road
employers through its Restaurants Advancing Industry Standards in
Employment (RAISE), which includes restaurant employers committed
to raising wages and working conditions for workers.390
The ultimate challenge with such nongovernmental advocacy,
however, is that there are currently an insufficient number of unions,
worker centers, or other nonprofit organizations that exist across the
country to engage in this kind of advocacy. Those jurisdictions that are
least likely to enact anti-wage theft laws may also be least likely to have
a robust worker organization. That raises the critical issue of what
nongovernmental strategies can be effective in those places. Information
sharing mechanisms provide a potential to reach beyond specific
jurisdictions. Consumer pressure, too, offers a way to hold nationwide
385. See Greg Asbed & Sean Sellers, The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive, Verifiable and
Sustainable Change for Farmworkers, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 39, 43–45 (2013).
386. Campaign for Fair Food, COALITION OF IMMOKOALEE WORKERS, https://ciwonline.org/campaign-for-fair-food/ [https://perma.cc/GD5Y-ZWQD]; Frequently Asked Questions,
FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/resources/frequently-askedquestions/ [https://perma.cc/X3MT-EXEU].
387. Milk with Dignity Campaign (Migrant Justice), NAT’L ECON. & SOC. RTS. INITIATIVE,
https://www.nesri.org/programs/milk-with-dignity-campaign-migrant-justice
[https://perma.cc/5LEB-DH3U].
388. About the Milk with Dignity Campaign, MIGRANT JUSTICE JUSTICIA MIGRANTE (Oct. 3,
2017), https://migrantjustice.net/milk-with-dignity [https://perma.cc/HT62-8XF9].
389. About Us, DINERS UNITED, http://dinersunited.org/ [https://perma.cc/B5BA-5S7M].
390. RESTAURANTS
ADVANCING
INDUSTRY
STANDARDS
IN
EMPLOYMENT,
http://www.raiserestaurants.org/ [https://perma.cc/LK25-78RT].
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businesses at the top of the supply chain accountable, such that efforts
can have impacts beyond traditionally progressive jurisdictions. Further,
local organizations that recognize the issue of wage theft within their
communities may need to seek out support for capacity building and
fundraising from more well-established organizations within the state.391
As nongovernmental advocacy provides a strong counterpoint to wage
theft, it suggests that worker movements may want to consider the ways
in which strengthening such organizing within and across communities
may be more beneficial than getting new anti-wage theft laws enacted.
CONCLUSION
Low-wage workers will undoubtedly face wage theft and other forms
of workplace exploitation for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, federal
enforcement efforts will likely continue to languish in the short term.
Given the current climate, addressing workplace rights at the state and
local levels continues to be necessary. Yet enacting laws that rely on
commonly failed regulatory strategies will likely also result in failure.
Instead, this Article identifies several promising possibilities for traction
in the protracted fight against wage theft. These include regulatory
strategies that: (1) expand the way in which agencies learn about
problems, such as anonymous complaints, community organizations,
and wage reports from employers; (2) hold high-risk employers
accountable before wage theft happens, such as through licensing or
wage bond requirements; and (3) require interactive educational efforts
that are specifically tailored for employer and worker populations.
Newly enacted laws too may not always be the answer. Rather,
advocating for different approaches by government may more readily
reduce wage theft. Government can potentially regulate more effectively
if it rejects a one-size-fits-all approach and collaborates with employer
networks and worker organizations. Further, nongovernmental solutions
may provide a better answer, particularly in places where reform at the
state and local level is unlikely. While such efforts are not yet
widespread, they provide a window into how workers can use public
pressure, by organizing cooperatives, direct actions, online discussions,
or consumers, to rebalance the power between employers and workers.

391. There is a general need to better fund worker centers or community-based organizations. See
VALENZUELA JR. ET AL., supra note 47, at 25; Shannon Gleeson, From Rights to Claims: The Role of Civil
Society in Making Rights Real for Vulnerable Workers, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 669, 689–90 (2009).

